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Abstract 
This paper offers a coherent assessment of the stability created by nuclear deterrence 
between India and Pakistan. Our examination posits the neorealist understanding of the 
stability created by nuclear deterrence in relation to alternative frameworks.  To unfold 
the varying theoretical presuppositions upon which the concept of stability is based, 
three logically constructed analyses will be undertaken where the theories are explored 
in relation to empirical data. The Kargil Crisis in 1999 and the Twin Peak Crises did 
indeed reveal inconsistencies in the theory of nuclear deterrence, and the domestic 
situation in Pakistan has on several occasions threatened the nuclear stability between 
the countries. With this undertaking, a nuanced understanding of the stability created by 
nuclear deterrence will be offered.   
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1. Introduction  
Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and thus the end of the 
Second World War, the US enjoyed almost a decade of unrivalled military superiority. 
But with the surprising nuclear explosion test in 1949, the Soviet Union demonstrated 
its skills with and knowledge of nuclear physics. Especially the nuclear bomb testing of 
19551 proved the ability of the USSR to design and create nuclear weapons, closing the 
gap to the US in terms of firepower.  
 
As the nuclear stockpiles grew and their delivery systems evolved, the ability of both 
the US and the Soviet Union to defend themselves from a nuclear attack dwindled. This 
led to a change in the strategy behind nuclear weapons, from a strategy of denial to a 
strategy of deterrence2 (Alagappa, 2008: 2). This strategic scenario was commonly 
known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) wherein aggression from one part 
would provoke a guaranteed annihilating counter-attack. A nuclear deterrence capability 
required large nuclear arsenals to ensure that a sufficient nuclear force would survive a 
first strike and to guarantee a vast retaliatory strike that would deter aggression 
(McLean & McMillan, 2009: 147-148). 
 
Especially the Cuban missiles crisis in 19623 threatened to topple the power balance in 
the Cold War, and in its aftermath several agreements were concluded in order to avoid 
a war between the superpowers. Most noticeable was the SALT (Strategic Arms 
Limitations Talks) during the seventies where the leaders of the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed to keep their nuclear defences at a minimum. Hereby the 
deterrence strategy was ensured as both parts agreed to stay vulnerable to any (counter-) 
attack and therefore deterred from hostilities. 
                                                             
1 The 1949 tests were staged testing's, thus not actual bombs being tested. 
2 The strategy of denial refers to the ability to defend and turn away an incoming attack. Strategy of 
deterrence, on the other hand, refers to the ability to deter an opponent from action by promising 
retaliation in case of an attack. 
3 In relation to the risk of nuclear war during by the Cuba Crisis, John F Kennedy stated in a live-
broadcast from the White House on the 22nd of October 1962, that at nuclear war would have disastrous 
consequences: “Even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth” (BBC E). 
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1.1 Nuclear Weapons in a Post‐Bipolar Setting: Interests and Importance  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many foresaw a demise of nuclear weapons in 
world politics. During the nineties, there was a seemingly widespread disinterest in 
nuclear weapons among the western Nuclear Weapon States, (Alagappa, 2008: 3-4). But 
in the early 2000's the role of the nuclear bomb in a globalised world was reaffirmed as 
several state leaders underlined their commitment to nuclear weapons, and the 
importance of these in their arsenal:  
 “'Nuclear forces continue to play a critical role in the defence of the United 
 States, its allies, and friends.'” (US Nuclear Posture Review, 2002, in Alagappa, 
 2008: 1) 
 “'Russia [considers] nuclear deterrence as the main element guaranteeing 
 its security. Maintaining a minimally sufficient number of nuclear  weapons to 
 ensure nuclear deterrence remains one of the most important  policy 
 priorities.'” (Vladimir Putin, 2006: ibid) 
This resumed focus on nuclear weapons is largely due to the increasing interest for this 
kind of weaponry in the Middle East and Asia. The increasing nuclear stockpiles of 
China, India and Pakistan have affirmed that the significance of nuclear weapons in 
world politics is not bygone. 
 1.2 The India‐Pakistan Conflict 
The effect and role of nuclear weapons is especially intriguing in the conflict between 
India and Pakistan. Both countries possess nuclear capacities and have fought a number 
of open wars and experienced several crises since the partition in 1947. 
 
Following the partition that led to independence from the British, the main difficulty 
was that both nations wanted full control over Kashmir and were not willing to 
compromise. While Pakistan’s arguments were partly based on religion, as the majority 
of the Kashmir population is Muslim, India’s was based on the historical Hindu rule in 
the region and the wish to create a secular state. Additionally, India feared that letting 
Kashmir go would trigger additional secessionist drives in the country. These 
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arguments, along with the issue of territory and water, remain the basis of the conflict 
today (Khan, 2009: 63). 
 
When India conducted several nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan promptly followed suit 
and responded with nuclear tests of its own, fuelling fears of a new nuclear arms race. 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons was met with open arms in the region as there was a 
widespread belief that these weapons and their deterring effect would be able to solve 
all outstanding issues between the two adversaries, including the issue of Kashmir 
(Waltz, 2003: 111). Consider, for example, this argument from 1999 put forward by 
senior Pakistani diplomat Shamshad Ahmad: “In South Asia nuclear deterrence may, 
[...], usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the 
requisite incentives for resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and 
Kashmir” (Ahmad, 1999: 125). However, it soon became clear that a solution to the 
Kashmir dispute was a long time coming.  
 With the Kargil crisis in 1999, where Pakistani troops and militants crossed the Line of 
Control and seized Indian positions in the Kashmiri Kargil district, the risk of an all-out 
war between the two nuclear weapon states seemed imminent. The conflict did, 
however, not escalate into nuclear war but the notion that nuclear weapons equal peace 
was called into question. Two years later both countries deployed hundreds of thousands 
of soldiers along their collective border and once again the possibility of an all-out war 
seemed to be in the offing. Again, the international society held its breath, dreading an 
escalation into a nuclear war with unimaginable consequences. However, the standoff 
never actually came to bloodshed, but the stability in the region was seriously rattled. 
 
The instability that these crises reveal is further emphasized by the element of terrorism 
that has been present throughout the conflict. Following the abovementioned crises 
several terrorist attacks on different targets within both India and Pakistan have taken 
place. Attacks committed by Pakistani based militants count, among others, the 2000 
suicide attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi, the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament 
and the 2006 and 2008 Mumbai bombings (Swami, 2009: 144-147). Additionally, there 
have been a number of terrorist attacks within both Pakistani- and Indian held Kashmir 
(Swami, 2009: 146).   
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Not only are the tensions high between the two states, but both states are also troubled 
with domestic violence. In Pakistan, armed Islamic groups aim at introducing Sharia-
law, openly battling the government and in India as much as one third of the army is 
busy keeping insurgency under control, including the secessionists in Kashmir 
(Rajagopalan: 2008, 192-193).  
The internal unrest in both countries and their extensive history of war, crises and 
terrorism paint a picture of an unstable conflict situation. Terrorist attacks and crises 
have taken place notwithstanding prospects of escalation into nuclear war and thus the 
deterring effect of nuclear weapons necessarily has to be questioned.  What are the 
limits of nuclear deterrence? What does it encompass and what does it leave out? With 
the India-Pakistan conflict as the point of departure, this paper is an attempt to clarify 
the limits and advantages of nuclear deterrence and to examine the efficiency of this as 
a means of ensuring stability. With this in mind we have formulated the following 
question: 1.3 Research Question: 
To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? 
 
2.  Methodological Approach 
2.1 Clarification of Research Question 
Three working questions have been formulated which will be used as tools for 
answering the research question and for upholding a thread throughout this paper.  
1. Are India and Pakistan fulfilling Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear 
deterrence?  
2. What is the significance of the Kargil and Parakram crises for stability? 
3. In what way have domestic actors influenced the stability between India and 
Pakistan?  
Each of the three parts will structurally and logically underpin the argumentation of the 
paper. The structure is based upon a dialectic reasoning, namely thesis, antithesis, 
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synthesis. The thesis offers a proposition on stability in relation to nuclear deterrence. In 
fact, the proposition, based upon neorealism, asserts that nuclear deterrence creates 
stability on the higher levels. The antithesis is divided into two parts and outlines two 
propositions to the understanding of stability. The first, based on working question 
number two, will offer a more nuanced understanding of the stability created by nuclear 
deterrence while staying within the realist presuppositions.  With the second antithesis, 
we will present another perspective on stability by answering working question number 
three. Finally, in the synthesis (conclusion) the contradictions between the thesis and the 
antitheses will be reconciled by offering a nuanced account of the stability created by 
nuclear deterrence. Thus, taking a point of departure in the concept of stability, each of 
the parts offers differing perspectives upon the issue of the stability created by nuclear 
deterrence..     
 2.2 The Logic Construction of the Paper 
2.2.1 Thesis 
Nuclear deterrence creates stability in the sense of absence of war: Neorealism 
The theoretical framework chosen for the thesis persists within the realm of realism. 
More specifically it consists of Waltzian neorealism. The choice of Kenneth Waltz, a 
central figure within neorealism, for constructing the thesis and thus the point of 
departure of the analysis is mainly based upon two factors: the realist heritage and 
Waltz’s extensive theorising on the subject.  
 
Firstly, realism is strongly entwined in the very emergence of nuclear deterrence theory. 
In fact, the realist school was among the first to offer accounts on the matter during the 
cold war, and has therefore become almost indispensable for nuclear deterrence. 
Accordingly, the first generation of nuclear strategists, including Bernard Brodie and 
Thomas Schelling, explored the possible implications for the advent of nuclear weapons 
in global politics in a cold war setting (Lobell et al., 2009: 4). Two possible implications 
of nuclear weapons were outlined: the imperative for nuclear powers to limit war, and 
the risk that nuclear weapons could be used as a coercive instrument to achieve political 
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ends. Due to this theorising on the subject, the realist school has been highly influential 
for the first understandings of nuclear deterrence and should thus be included. 
Secondly, Waltz, influenced by this heritage, has continued to theorise on the subject 
within the frame of neorealism. In fact, the discussion of nuclear deterrence is highly 
present in the optimist/pessimist debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. Waltz 
advocates nuclear proliferation and supports his assumptions with the argument that the 
possible disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons are a reliable guarantee 
for them not being employed. As Waltz expresses this:  
“[…] the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning 
them, the more surely the country invites retaliation and its own 
destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. […]. 
War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for.” 
(Waltz, 2003; 6).  
The argument rests upon the assumption of rationality, an established realist notion that 
is central to the Waltzian understanding of nuclear deterrence. Sagan replies with 
organisational arguments, claiming that rationality cannot automatically be assumed, 
undermining the Waltzian arguments.  
Moreover, Waltz has developed a framework for evaluating nuclear deterrence with the 
formulation of three requirements for efficient deterrence. Following the Waltzian logic, 
if the three requirements are fulfilled by India and Pakistan nuclear stability will persist 
between the two adversaries.  
2.2.2 Antithesis 1 
Nuclear deterrence assures stability on a higher level, but is not able to increase 
stability on a lower level: Stability/Instability Paradox 
 
In this part, the Waltzian understanding of nuclear deterrence will be nuanced. The 
theoretical resource for this undertaking, namely the stability/instability paradox, does 
not challenge the premises of Waltz, but offers a framework for understanding the limits 
of Waltz´s assessment of efficient nuclear deterrence. In this sense, one might argue that 
this attempt does not offer a sufficient opposition to Waltz as only the scope of nuclear 
deterrence is questioned, and not nuclear deterrence as such, and could thus not be 
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considered an antithesis. Indeed, a proper opposition is not undertaken. Nonetheless, we 
believe that in order to be able to dispute Waltz’s perception of stability, it is firstly 
necessary to accept the neorealist presuppositions. Moreover, the aim of the paper is not 
to reject the neorealist assumptions as such, but rather to seek a more nuanced approach 
to the India-Pakistan conflict and the level of stability by including alternative 
understandings. Indeed, to include a broad theoretical framework is interesting, as it 
enables us to move beyond the frame of Waltzian neorealism and assess supplementary 
approaches.  
 
2.2.3 Antithesis 2 
Domestic factors in India and Pakistan may affect stability and ultimately nuclear 
deterrence 
 
In order to go beyond structural explanatory factors and explore specific domestic 
factors that are of importance to stability, neoclassical realism will be presented. This 
school is, as the name implies, derives from realism. However, contrary to Waltzian 
neorealism it acknowledges not only the existence of non-state actors, but also their 
ability to influence state behaviour. Thus, neoclassical realism will function as a tool for 
analysing the importance of domestic factors in the India-Pakistan conflict. It could be 
argued that other alternative frameworks, such as various Innenpolitik theories focusing 
exclusively on domestic factors would offer in-depth approaches going beyond the 
realist school. The choice of remaining within realism, and thus within the same 
ontological position, is explained by the importance of structural factors in shaping the 
conflict. Furthermore, although Scott Sagan is critical towards the realist assumption 
about the rational behaviour of states, he does, in similarity to the neoclassical realist 
position, put great emphasis on the significance of domestic factors. He claims that the 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is highly dependent on internal stability and the level 
of civil control.  
2.2.4 Synthesis/Conclusion 
The differing understandings of stability in relation to nuclear deterrence will here be 
reconciled. In fact, the very reason for choosing an approach that consists of applying 
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differing theoretical perspectives is the aim of finding an approach that can take 
additional complexities into account and offer a deeper understanding of the problem 
we seek to unveil. This does, moreover, offer the possibility of taking the analysis to 
another level and propose novelty to the domain.  
 2.3 Clarification of Concepts 
2.3.1 Concepts of stability 
As the term stability will be used widely in the report, it is necessary to have a clear idea 
of what this term encompasses. The stability concepts used in this paper originate from 
the Stability-Instability Paradox, and is in essence simple. It is divided into high level 
and low-level stability. Stability will here be defined by its antonym, namely war. 
 
Figure India-Pakistan Escalation Ladder, Source: Sahni, 2007: 194 
High level stability: High level stability implies stability at the existential level. Threats 
hereto are thus absolute, for example total wars – wars with no holds barred. 
From the moment nuclear weapons are introduced in a war, a transition takes place from 
a low to a high stability threat. The use of nuclear weapons is confined to existential 
threats which theoretically excludes them being used at lesser threats. This is 
represented in the top of the triangle. It is important to note that high-level wars are not 
restricted to nuclear wars but can be wars fought with conventional means.   
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Low Level stability: By low-level stability is implied stability where there is neither 
nuclear war nor conventional war that could threaten the existence of the state. This 
concept refers to the three levels below the nuclear level in the triangle. Territory, 
soldiers and prestige etc. might be lost in the war, but no existential threat is posed. 
These wars are thus conventional wars, but at a controlled scale. The distinction 
between the three subsequent levels is nonetheless vague. 
Conventional wars: These wars can be large, but will not include nuclear weapons, 
although they, due to the unpredictable nature of war, quickly can escalate to the nuclear 
level. 
Sub-conventional or Limited wars: These wars are fought with conventional means, but 
contrary to conventional wars, they are limited in time, space and scale. These will 
typically include small-scale incursions by Special Forces and fighter-bombers targeting 
terrorist camps, or other specific strategic targets. 
Assymetric wars: An asymmetric war is a war where a substantially interior non-state 
actor fights a state. For example Operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.  
Proxy-wars: Proxy wars are wars where one parts fight the counter part through a third 
part, i.e. sponsoring someone’s fight as this correlates with one´s interest. E.g the 
Mujahideen's fight against USSR in Afghanistan was supported and sponsored by the 
US. 2.4 Theoretical Difficulties 
As mentioned above, the aim is neither to test nor reject the theories used, but rather to 
explore their limits and forces for explaining the stability created by nuclear 
deterrence. Nonetheless, this might cause difficulties since the theories have 
fundamentally differing presuppositions. Waltz´s exclusion of the domestic dimension 
and the privileging of structural factors inhibit criticism towards neorealism relating to 
domestic factors, as they are simply not explored within a Waltzian framework. The 
risk is thus that any disapproval on specific points is impossible, as it would be like a 
conversation between deaf, i.e. the so called “level-of analysis” problem. The 
theoretical discussion will thereby mainly evolve around what the theories include and 
exclude, and what repercussions this could have for the concept of stability. 
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Nonetheless, this inhibits detailed comparison between the theories, a limit inherent to 
the method chosen. However, the theories are not applied in order for us to reject their 
general validity, but rather to explore their approach to stability in relation to nuclear 
deterrence, their advantages and their disadvantages. In fact, this difficulty could be 
perceived as an advantage, as the differing theories enables us detach from the 
presuppositions of one theory to another.  2.5 Empirical Considerations 
When approaching the field of study, a number of difficulties appear. Firstly, we are 
inevitably dependent upon the collection of data from secondary sources, (such as 
different publications) as we are not able to investigate the field directly. This risk is 
inherent to the qualitative approach, as one is depending upon subjective accounts that 
are not necessarily aiming towards objectivity. Being aware of the constant risk it 
represents to rely upon various secondary sources and adopting a critical approach 
towards this situation is part of the remedy. Moreover, a number of conscious choices 
have been made throughout the process, whereby attempts have been made to include a 
wide range of secondary sources. Taking a brief look at our bibliography, this is evident 
in the way we have strived towards employing sources from India, Pakistan, the US, 
Great Britain etc. When reading articles from local Pakistani or Indian newspapers, it 
becomes evident that there are strong emotional biases underlying the approach 
adopted. This is especially clear when reading the depiction of particularly sensitive 
events in Indian and Pakistan newspapers (e.g. the Mumbai bombing, and the 
parliament attacks in New Delhi), where the depictions can differ significantly. In the 
cases where we have employed sources from the two countries, most significantly in the 
form of newspaper articles etc., they have been used mainly for explanatory purposes.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the conflict between India and Pakistan is an 
infected issue, not only for Pakistan and India, but various actors are involved and have 
an interest in shaping the depiction of the conflict. Being aware of the high stakes 
required us to constantly approach the matter critically. 
 
Roskilde University 
Global Studies, Autumn 2010  
Maia Juel Giorgio, Tina Søndergård Madsen, Mark Westh, Jakob Wiegersma,  
       
15 | P a g e  
 
2.6 Delimitations 
In the following we seek to clarify the motivation behind the deliberate choices we have 
made and our arguments for leaving out elements that could be perceived as relevant for 
answering the research question. This is done with the aim of increasing the validity and 
transparency of the paper.  
 
2.6.1 The role of the US 
It could be argued that the US plays an important role as it has significant interest in 
both states. Indeed, it is involved with both Pakistan and India, although in 
fundamentally different ways. The relation to India is primarily economical whereas the 
connection with Pakistan is primarily founded on Pakistan’s role as an ally in the war 
against terror. Furthermore, the US has been influential in the sense that it has 
functioned as a mediator both in the Kargil crisis and the Twin Peaks crisis.  
We have, nonetheless, chosen only to include the role of the US to a limited extent. 
Although the US may play an important role in some aspects of the relationship, it can 
be argued that a focus on the direct relation between the two states is reasonable, as the 
research question prepares the grounds for an analysis of the stability inherent in this 
relationship.  
2.6.2 Domestic factors 
In chapter 6 we analyse the importance of domestic actors in shaping the conflict and 
thus influencing stability. The focus will be on the military and militant groups 
exclusively. This is not to imply that other domestic actors have not been important and 
influential in the conflict. It could, for instance, be argued that there are domestic 
economic interests in both states that may have been able to exert their influence and to 
some extent participate in altering the course of events. Also, it is argued that India’s 
rising economy requires it to see its “neighboring countries as essential arteries for 
regional trade and resources rather than as security threats” (Hogg, 2007). However, 
the conflict between India and Pakistan is not primarily founded on economic 
divergence, but is based mainly on the territorial issue of Kashmir. Thus, the military 
and certain militant groups have an apparent relevance. Moreover, acknowledging 
Pakistan’s history of recurring military coups and long periods of military rule, the 
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military appears to have a rather significant role. Due to the constraints in the extent of 
this paper and the relatively limited time available, we find it pertinent to narrow our 
focus to only two actors (the military and militant groups). 
 
Additionally, the analysis will mainly evolve around the (degree of) influence of 
different domestic actors in Pakistan and will thus only take into account domestic 
factors in India and the influence of these on the conflict to a very limited extent. This is 
not to eliminate the possibility that several domestic actors are, and have been, 
influential in Indian foreign policy. However, as stated above, Pakistani militants have 
been especially active in both Kashmir and in India. Moreover, Pakistan is particularly 
interesting in what concerns civil-military relations, as the separation has historically 
been diffuse. India, on the other hand, has since independence striven towards a strict 
distinction between civil matters and military matters (Oldenburg, 2010: 170). It has 
been argued that the emphasis on a clear division between military and civil matters was 
made as a reaction to the somewhat unbalanced Pakistani structure of civil-military 
relations: “It would not be surprising if an important factor in the military’s acceptance 
of its role subordinate to civilians and elected politicians would be its view of the 
experience of the Pakistani army in taking over its country.”(Oldenburg, 2010: 171). As 
will be elaborated in the analysis, the role of the military as an influential domestic actor 
is discussed within the neoclassical realist approach, and central to nuclear proliferation 
pessimist Scott Sagan.  
 2.7 Validity and Generalisability  
Our focus is exclusively on the conflict between India and Pakistan and we are 
interested in the effect of nuclear deterrence for enhancing stability in this specific 
context. Thus, we find it plausible to adopt a qualitative approach to the research 
question. Instead of drawing in numerous empirical examples in order to reach a 
conclusion based on quantitative measures we seek to understand the implications of the 
conflict between the two states in the light of nuclear deterrence. We will go in depth 
with specific elements of the conflict in order to draw conclusions on the extent to 
which nuclear deterrence has enhanced stability.   
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No attempt is made to reach conclusions that could be generalisable to other settings 
where nuclear weapons are at play. We acknowledge the specificity of the conflict, and 
this particularity limits the possibility of generalisation. Nonetheless, the various 
theoretical understandings of stability could be used as frameworks for a broader 
understanding of the complexity of the concept of stability.  
 2.8 Project Design 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Neorealism: Origins and Assumptions 
The separation between classical realism and neorealism was made with the emergence 
of Kenneth Waltz´s famous oeuvre “Theory of International Politics” from 1979. 
Although Waltz partly rejected notions within classical realism, he was influenced by 
classical realism and maintained a number of basic assumptions still of importance for 
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understanding his framework. The concept of power is strikingly central to realism, as it 
is a necessary requirement for any group to attain objectives, no matter the nature of the 
objective. The difference between the branches within realism persists in the specific 
definition of the goal (which is particularly clear between defensive and offensive 
realists). 
 
However, while classical realism is a heterogeneous set of inductive theories aiming at 
exploring the sources of state power in international politics (Lobell et al, 2009: 16), 
Waltz’s neorealism transfers the focus from the nation to international structural factors. 
Classical realism is a set of reflections, mainly philosophical, that contains a wide and 
diverse field of interests spanning from the problems leaders encounter in conducting 
foreign policy, over power distribution among states to the character of the state and its 
relation to domestic society. The different branches within classical realism do, 
however, share the common denominator of focusing on the nation state, and not 
specifically on the constraints of the international structures. Moreover, while classical 
realism approaches the field of study inductively, Waltzian realism rejects this method, 
and adopts a positivist deductive methodological rigour with the aim of identifying 
recurring patterns of world politics. This turn towards a deductive approach has been 
widely supported within realism more generally (Lobell et al, 2009; 20). That said, 
Waltzian neorealism is highly influenced by classical realism and neorealism is partly 
derived from this tradition. 
 
3.1.1 Anarchy 
Characteristic to the work of Waltz is the presupposition of unity of the state and 
anarchy in the international system. His argumentation is built upon a dichotomy of the 
unitary rational state in relation to the anarchy reigning beyond in the international 
system. In this condition of anarchy the state is the sole coherent actor. What connects 
Waltz to classical realists like Hobbes and Machiavelli is the underlying pessimistic 
perception of the human nature. Indeed, in his work Leviathan, Hobbes argues that 
human beings are inherently egoistic: 
“[…] the disposition of men are naturally such, that except they be 
restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust 
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and dread each other, and as by natural right he may, so by necessity he 
will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, towards the 
preservation of himself” (Hobbes, 1996: 315) 
Waltz´s neorealism is clearly inspired by this perception, but instead of focusing on the 
individual he transfers the notion of egoism to the nation state with the self-help 
system4. Thus, it can be argued that although Waltz is not concerned specifically with 
the human nature, he is clearly influenced by the classical realist presupposition of 
pessimism (Lobell et al 2009:14).  
 
3.1.2 Structures, balance of power and stability 
State behaviour 
Waltz’ neorealism (or structural realism) differs from other realist schools as it is 
preoccupied with the structures of the international system. He emphasizes the 
supremacy of structural factors (Realpolitik) over domestic issues (Innenpolitik) (Lobell 
et al, 2009: 10). In this respect, Waltz is clearly inspired by classical realism. In “The 
Prince” Machiavelli expressed the necessity of a hierarchical order in politics in order to 
pursue the national interest5. Machiavelli argues that hierarchy should reign between the 
state (the prince) and the society (the masses). Waltz distinguishes between “high” 
(foreign policy, military and strategic policy etc.) and “low” (societal questions, 
economics etc.) politics and asserts that the domain of high politics is crucial because in 
this domain states are capable of shaping policies that best serve their primary interest – 
namely ensuring the security of the state.  
Moreover, the presupposition of anarchy developed above, as being a transcendent and 
unchangeable condition in international relations has implications for the role of the 
                                                             
4 The self-help system refers to the fact that all states egoistically have to strive towards their survival due 
to the uncertainty in what concerns other actors´ behaviour.   
5 Machiavelli stresses the notion of nation-state and the importance of an order established by a superior. 
In the Prince, written in a context of political and geographical fragmentation in Italy, Machiavelli 
introduces the rule of the prince as being crucial for the establishment of a certain order. The prince, the 
enlightened despot would thus, often by manipulation (cruelty is preferred above mercy), gather the 
people under his rule in order to be successful in war. Indeed, Machiavelli proposes the Prince only to 
dedicate himself to the people in times of peace: ”(…) while his only object should be the art of war, he 
must in times of peace pay attention to moral qualities in such a manner as to be able to use them in times 
of war” (Mansfield, 1998: 5) 
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state. The structures of the international system determine the behaviour of the state, 
and the state must, first and foremost, assure its own survival.  The state is thereby 
subjected to a set of constraining conditions or structural limitations in terms of 
capabilities to balance its position in relation to other states. Indeed, states will respond 
to international systemic incentives and enhance their competitive advantage in order to 
survive, although the way in which they proceed may differ. In this respect, it is 
important to note that Waltz’s understanding of rational behaviour implies that the state 
will always strive towards ensuring its own survival in an anarchic system. State leaders 
are thus determined as their decisions are defined exclusively on the basis of structural 
pressures (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 75-76).  
Balance of power 
States can strive to ensure their preservation either through internal balancing 
(increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances) in 
relation to other states capacities. Waltz also introduced the distinction between 
bandwagoning and balancing, where the former refers to a state joining a greater state, 
while the latter refers to a state joining other states to balance against the great state. 
Changes in the international system do thus depend upon the structure and composition 
of the great states, and more precisely upon the relative capacity of the state.  
 
The neorealist notion of stability 
Stability is, according to Waltz, best enhanced through bipolarity:” With only two great 
powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the system” (Waltz, 1979: 204). In fact, 
this system implies the preservation of these states. Waltz mentions three reasons for 
why bipolarity is the best structure for enhancing stability. Firstly, there are less great-
power conflicts than in a multipolar structure. Secondly, since there are only two great 
powers, deterrence will be easier to uphold, and finally, there is less risk of 
miscalculation in a system where only two powers reign (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010: 
76).  
 
By stability, Waltz refers to a situation where anarchy is momentarily tamed, but he 
does not offer a more specific account of the concept of stability. It is possible, however, 
to identify an implicit understanding of stability. Waltz consistently ranks stability and 
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peace alongside the mere absence of war: “The chances of peace arise if states can 
achieve their most important ends without using force. War becomes less likely as the 
costs of war rise in relation to possible gains” (Waltz, 2003: 3). This is also indicated in 
the way Waltz refers to the previous half century of so-called nuclear peace, implying 
merely the absence of nuclear war (Waltz, 1995: 93). When exploring the question of 
nuclear weapons and deterrence, Waltz is preoccupied with the ability of (nuclear) states 
to discourage other states from attacking and thus with the ability of nuclear deterrence 
to create or enhance stability and peace (Waltz, 2003: 4). Finally, as Waltz recognizes 
the decline of bipolarity in the international system, he argues that nuclear weapons – 
and the deterrent effect they entail – “ […] restore the clarity and simplicity lost as 
bipolar situations are replaced by multipolar ones” (Waltz, 2003: 14). Nuclear 
deterrence thus becomes the new source of stability replacing bipolarity.  
 3.2 Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
It is important to understand the main notions of this theory, as it is essential for 
answering the research question. Thus, the theory is central (a) as a framework for 
evaluating whether or not India and Pakistan are fulfilling the requirements for nuclear 
deterrence as they are put forward by Waltz, and (b) for understanding and critically 
assessing the neorealist notion of stability in relation to the India-Pakistan conflict.  
  
The notion of nuclear deterrence rests upon several neorealist assumptions, most 
significantly upon the assumption that states strive towards ensuring their own survival 
and security: “deterrent policies derive from structural theory, which emphasizes that 
the units of an international-political system must tend to their own security as best they 
can” (Waltz, 1995: 112). Thus, according to Waltz the logic of deterrence is highly 
derived from structural realism.   
 
The optimist vs. pessimist debate regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
based upon the different perceptions of the consequences of the spread of nuclear 
weapons. The pessimists, notably Sagan, argue that state rationality, unity and security 
are not matters of course. If this is not the case, the prerequisites for deterrence will not 
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be fulfilled, which will undermine the purpose of nuclear weapons and possibly lead to 
nuclear war. Waltz and the optimists, on the other hand, argue that states, no matter their 
shape and form, can see the danger posed by nuclear weapons and the importance of 
keeping their use hypothetical. Therefore, even a totalitarian regime will be restrained 
from using nuclear weapons.  
3.2.1 Theory of deterrence 
Deterrence is essentially the ability to make someone abstain from action by threat of 
retaliation. This has been developed into theories of deterrence. The basic assumption is 
that: Actor (A), fearing an attack from actor (B) seeks to alter (B)'s plans by threatening 
retaliation that in scope nullifies (B)'s potential gains (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298). 
There are however some prerequisites for this to function. Indeed, B has to be aware of 
(either know or believe in) A's will and capacity to retaliate. If B does not receive the 
threat nor believe in the retaliatory intentions of A, deterrence has failed. Kenneth Waltz 
(2003) additionally notes three prerequisites that necessarily have to be fulfilled for 
nuclear deterrence to be in effect. Firstly, a state must develop, not only the ability to 
inflict unacceptable damage to the other side, but also a sufficient degree of “second-
strike” survivability so that its nuclear forces have the possibility to retaliate if attacked. 
If a state cannot survive a nuclear attack, and does not have the means to inflict a 
retaliatory strike, there is no deterrence, because there is nothing that prevents the 
attacking state from striking, as the state is not prone to experience any punitive 
retaliation. Secondly, Waltz states that, “survival of forces must not require early firing 
in response to what may be false alarms.” (Waltz, 2003: 20). In other words, a state and 
its forces must not be prone to firing its retaliatory nuclear weapons on the basis of an 
unconfirmed attack, as this might lead to an unintended nuclear war. Finally, there must 
be an effective nuclear command and control system, as the nuclear arsenals must not 
be prone to accidental or unauthorized use (Waltz, 2003: 20). With an efficient 
command and control, the risks of theft and misuse of the nuclear weapons decline.  
Waltz thereby recognizes that this as an important requisite for effective deterrence. 
Ironically, no one knows when deterrence works, only when it does not. (Brown & 
Arnold, 2010: 298) 
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During and after the Second World War the US perceived their nuclear weapons as a 
mere extension of their conventional capabilities, preferably as shock weapons deployed 
early in a war. But as the USSR obtained nuclear weapons the US could no longer rely 
on their nuclear weapons as a trump, and the purpose of these weapons had to be 
reconsidered. (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298-299) 
Originally, the fact that both countries had the ability to strike civilian targets with 
nuclear weapons and the awareness of the terrible consequences seemed sufficient to 
maintain peace, as Churchill figuratively put it: “’by a process of sublime irony … safety 
will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation’” 
(Churchill in Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298). 
This notion was, however, challenged by Thomas Schelling, who advocated for the 
importance of a second-strike capability: 
 
“There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side has the 
capacity to obliterate the other, and one in which both sides have the capacity no 
matter who strikes first. It is not the ‘balance’ – the sheer equality or symmetry 
in the situation – that constitutes ‘mutual deterrence’; it is the stability of the 
balance” (Schelling in Brown & Arnold, 2010: 19). 
 
Hereby, he introduced the notion that states will only abstain from aggression when 
their offensive capabilities are insufficient in avoiding retaliation. Currently, Schelling’s 
assumption is one of the fundamental notions upon which nuclear doctrines are built. 
During the cold war enormous efforts were made to guarantee that a sufficient amount 
of nuclear weapons would survive a first strike and be ready for a retaliatory strike. As 
mentioned earlier, the US and the USSR agreed, in the SALT treaty, to limit the stocks 
to a minimal nuclear weapons defence in order to assure mutual vulnerability and thus 
deterrence (as advocated by the MAD- doctrine). Out of fear that a first strike would 
destroy a large amount of their nuclear weapons arsenal and that they would hereby lose 
the ability to retaliate sufficiently, both states did, during the Cold War, amass enough 
nuclear weapons to obliterate each other. Under the MAD doctrine the notion of what 
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was a bearable amount of damage was, according to McNamara6, defined as 25 percent 
of the population and 50 percent of the industry (Britannica-A). 
 
This notion was, however, dismissed by Mac George Bundy7, who stated that: 
 “Think-tank analysts can set levels of ‘acceptable’ damage well up in the tens of 
millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is 
somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real 
world of real political leaders […] a decision that would bring even one 
hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s country would be recognized in advance as 
a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond 
history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.” (Bundy in 
Brown & Arnold, 2010:300) 
 
Following this he therefore advocated “minimum deterrence”, whereby states should 
posses only enough nuclear weapons required to strike a few cities as he believed this 
would be sufficiently deterring. Since the cold war, there has been a shift towards 
minimum deterrence among nuclear weapons states. (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 148) 
 3.3 Neoclassical Realism 
Considering the theoretical framework developed above, some difficulties to conform 
the neorealist framework to current constraints appear. The fact that neorealism emerged 
in a specific historical context conditions the spectre covered by the theory. Waltzian 
realism perceives structural pressures as ultimately determinative for state behaviour 
and does thereby exclude domestic political conditions from the analysis. Neoclassical 
realism can be seen as an attempt to offer an alternative perspective, as realism and 
neorealism neglect to theorize the state. Indeed, what if a second-strike capability is not 
assured due to lack of organisation framework within the country? What if the staff, due 
to uncertainty, accidentally launch on a false alarm? And, finally, what if a state, due to 
disagreements, is not capable of assuring a proper control and command system? 
                                                             
6 McNamara, an American statesman of the US Secretary of Defense 1961-1968. 
7 MacGeorge Bundy was National Security adviser during President J. F. Kennedy and President L.B. 
Johnson. 
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States are, according to neorealists, different insofar as their capabilities differ, but they 
act similarly when confronted by threat, as they will strive for self-preservation.  
Criticism has been expressed and shared by scholars within and outside the Neorealist 
School, which has led to the development of for example constructivism and democratic 
peace theory. This has resulted in recent accounts that tend to widen the scope of 
analysis to include domestic factors. Neoclassical realism is inspired by early classical 
realist perceptions, somewhat offering a middle-way between liberal institutionalism 
and Realpolitik. Neoclassical realism may be closer to classical realism than neorealism, 
except in what concerns the methodological approach, which is, like within neorealism, 
deductive. Nonetheless, neoclassical realism differs from neorealism by adopting a 
qualitative and not a quantitative approach (Lobell et al, 2009: 20). 
In 1998, Gideon Rose coined the term neoclassical realism in a review published in 
World Politics. Rose does here explain the similarities, but does also mark the limits of 
the realist heritage: 
 
“Neoclassical realism argues that the scope of ambition of a country’s foreign 
policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Yet it 
contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and 
complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
unit-level variables such as decision-makers ´perception and state structure.“ 
(Rose in Lobell et al., 2009: 5)  
 
A certain hierarchy does also persist within neoclassical realism, as preponderance is 
given to structural factors. Structural variables are thus still primary, but nuanced: “[…] 
international imperatives [are] filtered through the medium of state structure” (Lobell et 
al. 2009: 3).  
 
International political outcome mirrors the actual distribution of power among states, 
but the policies pursued are rarely rational or objective. Moreover, neoclassical realists 
agree on the condition of anarchy, but regard anarchy as a permissive condition rather 
than an independent causal force. The extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-
military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the 
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degree of state autonomy from society and the degree of social cohesion are all factors 
that intervene between leaders´ assessment of international threats and opportunities, 
and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies these actors pursue.  
Domestic factors, such as the nature of the political system, reveal the complex 
relationship between systemic and unit-level variables “Unit-level variables constrain 
or facilitate the ability of all types of states-great powers as well as lesser states- to 
respond to systemic imperatives.” (Lobell et al., 2009; 4) 
In fact, according to neoclassical realists, the constraints upon the state are not 
exclusively external, but are also embedded within the state.  
 
4  Nuclear Capabilities of India and  Pakistan 
India and Pakistan are bitter rivals and nuclear weapon states. Since they have so far not 
engaged in a nuclear war, one might be prone to state that they are deterred by each 
other’s nuclear capabilities. Is it a coincidence that none of the states has initiated a 
nuclear war or are they in fact deterred? In order to explore this question, we will firstly 
outline the general characteristics of India and Pakistan as nuclear states, and thereafter 
analyse if India and Pakistan fulfil the three requirements developed by Waltz. 
 4.1. Becoming Nuclear Weapon States 
India’s nuclear program dates back to the late 1950s and was initially developed for 
civilian purposes and thus with peaceful intentions. However, when China tested its 
nuclear device in 1964, only two years after India had been soundly defeated by China 
in the Sino-Indian war, New Delhi decided, despite advice from the international 
society, to launch its own nuclear weapons program. Besides from the obvious motive 
of rising up to the Chinese threat, there were several other reasons for India to flex its 
muscles. In 1962 Pakistan and China formed an “anti-status-quo” alliance against India 
and were thus strategic allies. Given India’s history of wars with both countries, the 
state may have aimed at proving that it was able to stand up to the threat from its 
neighbours. Moreover, it is argued that India chose the nuclear-path because it wanted 
to assert its power status on the global stage (Khan, 2009: 77-80).  
Roskilde University 
Global Studies, Autumn 2010  
Maia Juel Giorgio, Tina Søndergård Madsen, Mark Westh, Jakob Wiegersma,  
       
27 | P a g e  
 
Pakistan instigated a secret nuclear weapons program in 1972, immediately after the end 
of the 1971 Bangladesh-war between India and Pakistan. Allegedly Pakistan initiated 
this program partly because it perceived the need to deter India with nuclear weapons, 
and partly due to its inferior position with regards to conventional forces and arms. 
Hereafter, the covert arms race between the two countries began and when India tested 
its nuclear device in 1974, Islamabad urgently advanced its nuclear program (Kerr and 
Nikitin, 2010: 2). 
 
Even though both India and Pakistan began developing their programs at an early stage, 
it was not until 1998, when both countries conducted nuclear tests, that they; “[…] both 
came out of the closet and declared their nuclear status to the world.” (Khan, 2009: 78).  
The tests evoked strong condemnation from the international society and economic 
sanctions were imposed on both states. However, this did not seem to trouble the two 
rivals and the development of the nuclear programmes proceeded. The sanctions on 
Pakistan were lifted in 2001 after the 9/11 terror-attacks, since the US needed Pakistan 
in its so-called “war on terror”. In order to avoid resentment and accusations of one-
sidedness, sanctions on India were lifted as well (BBC, A). Today, the Indian nuclear 
stockpile is estimated to include 60-80 warheads, of which only around 50 are fully 
operational (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 76). The means of delivery is assured through 
Aircraft, Land-based and Sea-based Missiles. It is difficult to estimate how many 
nuclear weapons Pakistan has produced and deployed, but it has been estimated to be 
approximately 70-90 warheads (Norris and Kristensen, 2009: 82). Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons can be delivered in three ways, with Aircraft, Ballistic Missiles or Cruise 
Missiles (See Appendix for detailed information)  
 4.2 Second‐Strike Survivability and Capability 
The first of Waltz’s requirements will be developed in the following section. In order to 
assess whether India and Pakistan fulfil Waltz’s requirement of “second-strike” 
survivability, which assures effective deterrence, an analysis of the nuclear doctrines 
and strategies of India and Pakistan will be undertaken. 
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India declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998, but it was not until five years later, 
in January 2003, that a nuclear doctrine was formalized. The contemporary nuclear 
doctrine is based upon a framework drafted in 1999 by the National Security Advisory 
Board (NSAB)8 (Roy-Chaudhury, 2009: 406).  
Within the doctrine, the nuclear weapons are a defensive asset only to be used as a 
response to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on Indian Territory or its military 
force. The doctrine does thus promote deterrence. Thereby, the nuclear doctrine is based 
on the principle of No First Use, which indicates that India will not be the first to launch 
a nuclear strike, but will only respond with retaliation should deterrence fail (Pant 
2005). As a result of this, the notion of Credible Minimum Deterrence was implemented 
in Indian nuclear policy. Generally, this is a rather unclear concept as no explicit 
definition to what this entails is offered. However, Credible Minimum Deterrence 
encompasses that if India is hit by a nuclear strike, it has ensured the means to initiate a 
nuclear retaliation. In other words, India asserts that is has the credibility and capability 
to strike back.  
Survivability has further been increased, as the Indian launchers are road- and rail 
mobile. India has the Dhanush missile, which is a sea-based deterrent, and has 
furthermore recently launched a nuclear submarine, which is difficult to target (Norris 
and Kristensen, 2010: 76). Moreover, India is procuring aircraft carriers and missile 
defence systems. Based on the abovementioned factors, it is fair to state that India 
promotes the capability of second-strike, which corresponds with Waltz´ first 
requirement of effective nuclear deterrence.  
 
Nuclear weapons are a vital and strategic asset to Pakistan, as they are regarded as the 
ultimate guarantee for the security and survival of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has since 
Independence always conceived itself as inferior to India in terms of conventional arms, 
and has used nuclear weapons to equalize the power asymmetry with India. Pakistan 
does not have a formal nuclear doctrine (Kazi, 2007). Nonetheless, based on various 
                                                             
8 This draft outlined the fundamental principles for the development, deployment and employment of 
India’s nuclear forces between 1998 and 2003, but was as the name implies, just a draft. In other words, 
there was no official strategy during five years on how India´s nuclear weapons should be used. It was 
first after international pressure and in the aftermath of Operation Parakram that India created its official 
nuclear weapons policy in 2003. In relation to this, a formal nuclear command structure was presented. 
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Pakistani statements from its strategic community, it is possible to outline some of its 
nuclear strategies. Pakistan has adopted the notion of minimum nuclear deterrence, 
implying that even though using a limited amount of resources, Islamabad has the 
means to assure destruction should this be required. This is for instance indicated by 
former Foreign Minister Abdul Satter who stated: 
 
“Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear 
strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build-
up will necessitate review and reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability 
and credibility of our deterrent, Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and 
upgrade its capability.” (Satter in Zeb, 2006: 390) 
 
Pakistan, contrary to India, does not have a No First Use policy. They have not ruled out 
a First Use of nuclear weapons policy, as the main priority of Pakistani nuclear weapons 
originally was to offset India’s superior conventional military (Zeb, 2006:394). Pakistan 
has refused to consider a No First Use agreement with India, and India has, in return, 
declined a Non-aggression agreement with Pakistan (Kazi, 2007). General Khalid 
Kidwai, head of the Strategic Plans Division in charge of nuclear operations in Pakistan, 
has stated that Islamabad will use its nuclear weapons in a first strike should Pakistan 
lose a large part of its territory or its military forces, be economically strangulated, or be 
destabilized domestically. It is interesting to assess how nuclear weapons can be used in 
a military context as well as a political. Not only has Pakistan been using nuclear 
weapons for defensive purposes, as a tool against conventional and nuclear weapons, 
they have also used it as an instrument that allows offensive low intensity conflicts 
(Snyder, 1965). We will return to this in Chapter 5. 
Pakistan has primarily developed a first strike capability, but is aware of the necessity of 
being able to strike back, and is thus currently implementing second-strike capabilities 
(Current Affairs, 2009). Indeed, according to a US congressional report, Pakistan has 
“[…] built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike 
capability in a nuclear war” and “It also has built road-mobile missiles, air defences 
around strategic sites, and concealment measures” (ibid.). 
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Therefore, we can state that even though India is more advanced in terms of second-
strike capabilities than Pakistan, both countries have the means to initiate a nuclear 
retaliation. Thus they both meet Waltz´ first requirement for effective deterrence as both 
countries should be deterred by each other’s second strike capabilities.  4.3 False Alarms and Early Firing 
In accordance with Waltz´ second requirement, retaliatory strike forces should not be 
prone to or reliant on early firing, if the projected attack turns out to be a false alarm. 
Firstly, to our knowledge, neither India nor Pakistan have been inclined to early firing 
and it is therefore impossible to assess whether or not they fulfil the second requirement 
for effective nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the requirement is difficult to investigate, as 
it relates to procedures nuclear forces are to follow should they believe they are under 
nuclear attack – procedures that are not official.  
Moreover, the weapon components of India have been dispersed throughout the country 
(Pant, 2005: 286). This separation of operating units from their weaponry, and the 
storage of the nuclear weapons themselves in dormant status, means that it takes time to 
assemble the nuclear weapons. Thus, according to Pant: 
 
”Since the weapons are not configured and mated to the delivery platforms, they 
are in a state of de-alert. The time to bring together these components and 
launch a second strike is reported to be few hours. This gives sufficient time for 
Indian leaders to verify and confirm the first strike before launching a counter 
strike” (ibid.). 
 
In regards to Pakistan, a Congressional Service Report states that ”Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons are reportedly stored unassembled, with the fissile core separated from the 
non-nuclear explosives” (Kerr and Nikitin 2008:6) and ”These components are stored 
separately from delivery vehicle” (ibid.) Furthermore, a recently published Harvard 
report states that Pakistan’s ”[…] nuclear weapons are believed to be stored in 
disassembled form, with the components stored in separate buildings.” (Bunn, 2010: 
29)  
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Therefore, it can be argued that Pakistan, as well as India, has implemented policies 
aiming towards preventing false alarms and ameliorate early firing. This has been 
termed “force-in-being” by Ashley Tellis (Tellis, 2001: 372). 
 Furthermore, if we a take point of departure in Waltz, states act rationally. A state 
would thus not risk firing its nuclear weapons if it is not sure that it is under attack. 
Should the perceived attack turn out to be a false alarm, it would not be rational for the 
state to “retaliate” as this would threaten the state’s survival. 
 
On the other hand, if the main focus for states is survival, they will not risk their 
sovereignty for anything. As an incoming strike might render the state defenceless, it 
might conclude that a launch on warning protocol might be risky in terms of doubtful 
first strike capability (towards the perceived aggressor), but it is nonetheless better than 
sitting back and doing nothing.  
  
“A former head of the US National Security Agency, General William Odom, 
characterized the choice facing a US president under or after a nuclear attack as 
‘releasing 70–80 percent of our nuclear megatonnage in one orgasmic whump, or 
just sitting there and saying: “Don’t do anything, and we will just take the 
incoming blow.”’”(Brown & Arnold, 2010: 302) 
  
This, however, could also be considered irrational, as an incoming attack equals a 
failure in deterrence, and launching one's own nuclear weapons would only cause more 
horror and grief with no apparent goal. 
 4.4 Nuclear Command and Control System 
The third and final requirement for effective nuclear deterrence is a proper command 
and control system. In the Indian case, the nuclear arsenal is, with the formalization of 
the 2003 doctrine, placed under the control of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) 
(Roy-Chaudhury, 2009:409). The NCA´s Political Council is headed by the Prime 
Minister, while the Executive Council is led by the National Security Advisor. The 
Prime Minister is the only person who can authorize the launch of missiles, while the 
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national security advisors role is to assist and ensure that the political councils’ orders 
are carried out. The operational arm of the NCA is the Strategic Forces Command 
(SFC) of India, who controls the nuclear warheads and delivery systems (Pant, 2005: 
280). As mentioned, the different nuclear components have been de-mated and spread 
throughout the country. This separation of the warhead from the delivery vehicle 
indicates that India decreases the risk of mischievous or accidental detonation of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, from a Waltzian perspective, it can be argued that India has an 
effective Nuclear Command and Control system.   
 
The Pakistan command and control system is based on a three-tier structure. The 
National Command Authority (NCA) is the highest decision-making authority in the 
nuclear command and control system, which includes both the president and the Prime 
Minister (Bremmer and Kuusisto, 2008: 10). The NCA is responsible for formulating 
policies and deploying its strategic nuclear forces. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) 
acts as the permanent secretariat for the NCA and assists in implementing NCA 
decisions. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) manages the operational control of the 
nuclear weapons and its delivery systems, which among others include a 10.000 strong 
guard that is assigned to protect its nuclear weapons sites (ibid.).  
Islamabad argues that their nuclear weapons are safely stored, and as Lt. Gen. Khalid 
Kidwai, head of SPD, states:  
 
“We have institutionalized the structures [overseeing the nuclear arsenal] and 
introduced modern technology so there are sufficient firewalls, safety, and 
security built into the chain of command, as well as into the weapons and 
weapon producing facilities.” (Norris and Kristensen, 2009:85).  
 
Assessing Pakistan’s doctrines, it should thus be taken into account that the weapons are 
stored unassembled and that nuclear cores have been separated from the rest of the 
weapon (force-in-being) (ibid.). We can on this background state that the mechanisms 
for security should be in place. Thus, Pakistan has a Command and Control that is 
effective (Jaspal in Zeb 2006:389-390), and therefore meets Waltz’s third requirement in 
what is needed for effective deterrence. However, we cannot conclude that theft of 
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nuclear weapons will not occur, as it is difficult to conclude whether Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons are prone to accidents or unauthorized use. 
 4.5 Sub Conclusion 
We have now assessed Waltz’s three requirements for effective deterrence between 
India and Pakistan. In regards to survivability of their nuclear arsenals, both meet this 
requirement as they have clearly stated that their nuclear weapons should be able to 
perform a retaliatory strike. Furthermore, India and Pakistan are procuring various 
delivery vehicles, such as nuclear submarines, which enhance second-strike capability. 
The second requirement, no early firing as a result of false alarm, is difficult to test 
empirically, as it is nearly impossible to find out the reactions of soldiers who believe 
they are under nuclear attack. However, by the fact that weapon components are 
separated from fissile cores, time is given for commanders to react appropriately, which 
reduces the risk of being subjected to false alarms. With regards to the third 
requirement, India has an effective command and control system with regards to the 
notion of force-in-being. As components take time to be assembled, unauthorized use or 
accidents are not likely to occur. Even though there are insurgent elements that might 
disrupt the Pakistani nuclear security in the future, it seems that currently, Pakistan, as 
well as India, is not prone to immediate theft and accidents of its nuclear weapons. 
Through their doctrines and statements, both countries believe in retaliatory action. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude, through Waltz´ framework, that both countries are 
deterred by each other, and thus that deterrence is in effect.  
 
5.   Nuclear Deterrence and the Kargil and Twin Peak 
    Crises 
This chapter will give insight in the two major crises between India and Pakistan in 
1999 and 2001-2002 respectively. The aim of this chapter is to explain the extent of the 
crises and thereafter discuss this in relation to the chosen theories. The importance of 
the two crises is expressed through the fact that they arguably can be seen as signs of 
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instability and could therefore be perceived as an anomaly of nuclear deterrence as 
explained in earlier chapters. 
Firstly, a brief introduction of the two crises will be undertaken, followed by a 
theoretical analysis of the crises. Any shortcomings of the theories and concepts will be 
sought remedied by drawing in additional theories and concepts. 
 5.1 The Kargil Crisis in 1999 
The Kargil crisis, also known as the Kargil War,9 was a military confrontation between 
Pakistan and India in the Kargil region of Kashmir.  The aggressor was Pakistan who 
during February 1999 sent troops, in civilian clothing, across the Indian Line Of Control 
(LoC). The operation was the brainchild of General Musharraf and aimed at occupying 
several strategic ridges, points and Indian military posts in Kashmir. These had routinely 
been left unoccupied during the winter, as the harsh Kashmir winter rendered them near 
inhospitable (Dittmer, 2005; 130). The Pakistani forces were a mix of regular soldiers 
and militants, and were supposed to appear simply as Kashmir insurgents. Pakistan 
sought, among other things, to gain an edge in the Lahore talks10 that were being held 
simultaneously, by performing a fait accompli which Islamabad could use to negotiate 
from a “position of strength”, and gain international focus on the Kashmir issue, an 
issue that India refused to discuss (Hagerty, 2009: 103, Basrur, 2008: 59). It should be 
noted that Sharif later claimed that he had not been fully informed on the operation by 
the military command. We will return to this in Chapter 6. 
 
Although the military feat of occupying these positions was quite extraordinary (several 
position were situated at +5.000 meters height), the Pakistani forces were not capable of 
withstanding the intense military counter-offensive by India, which consisted of up to 
30.000 soldiers supported by heavy artillery and fighter jets. The Indian forces were 
                                                             
9 Unfortunately, the definition of war is vague, and the Kargil crisis has been rather randomly referred to 
as both crisis and war. In this paper, we will refer to Kargil as a crisis. This is because we want to 
distinguish the Kargil crisis, which was an Assymetric war/limited war, from the large-scale conventional 
wars, 1948, 1965 and 1971, cf. the clarification of concepts. 
10 The Lahore talks were based upon the need for confidence building measures, in regards to exchanging 
information on nuclear and ballistic missiles tests etc. (Dittmer, 2005: 44) 
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opposed by a mixed force of approximately 5.000 Pakistani regulars and irregulars, 
where of 4/5 were mainly occupied with logistics (Hagerty, 2009: 101).  
Moreover, although the Pakistanis occupied the ridges and thus had a tactical advantage, 
the Indian forces met them head on, and did not, as might have been more tactically 
sound, cross the LoC elsewhere and cut off the Pakistan positions. The Indian forces 
hereby got into fierce close combat, and probably suffered far more casualties, but the 
conflict was still kept “low”11. After heavy fighting, the Indian troops managed to expel 
the intruders from most of their positions. Roughly six months after the infiltration, the 
Pakistani forces had withdrawn to their LoC and status quo ante bellum appeared.  
The Pakistani withdrawal was to a large degree a result of heavy US pressure and lack 
of Chinese support (and even condemnation) of Pakistan's incursion. As the aim of the 
operation, among others, was to bring international focus on the Kashmir issue (in 
Pakistan’s favour), the operation turned out to be rather embarrassing. Only after the US 
helped Sharif maintain a modicum of dignity, was he willing to call back the 
“Mujahedeen” fighters. (Kumar, 2008: 69) It should be noted that Musharraf, at the 
moment Chief of Army Staff, later complained, claiming that there was no reason to 
withdraw the forces, and criticised Sharif for giving in to early, an issue we will get 
back to in the next chapter on civil-military relations (Joeck, 2009: 126, Kumar, 2008: 
72, Dittmer, 2005: 144-146). It should be noted that by the time Sharif called back the 
troops, the Indian forces had already gained the upper hand and by July the 14th the 
fighting had essentially ceased (globalsecurity.org A). Estimates as to the losses suffered 
by both sides vary significantly, but according to Ganguly and Hagerty in Kumar (2008) 
roughly 1700 Indian soldiers and 800 Pakistanis perished.  
 5.2 Waltz and Deterrence on Kargil 
The Kargil crisis was a relatively intensive conflict between two nuclear states, both in 
terms of troops involved and casualties suffered. The scale of the conflict is particularly 
significant with regards to the deterring role of nuclear weapons. The presupposition of 
nuclear deterrence theory, that nuclear weapon states fearing escalation will abstain 
                                                             
11 Because the intruders were not officially backed by Pakistan, India could not justify attacking on 
Pakistani soil, as that would be an unprovoked aggression, even though there was little doubt that 
Pakistan was behind the intrusion. 
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from open conflict seems seriously challenged by the Kargil Crisis. As clarified in the 
previous chapter, the prerequisites for nuclear deterrence were in place and Pakistan 
ought to have been deterred from instigating the conflict. But the severity of nuclear 
weapons might ironically be their Achilles heel, as the sheer consequences of using 
nuclear weapons renders them near unusable. In fact, only a substantial threat might 
justify their use. 5.3 The Stability‐Instability Paradox 
The issue was addressed already in the fifties, among others by B. H. Liddell Hart, who 
questioned the extent to which nuclear weapons would provide stability. But the first 
time it was specifically addressed was in 1965 by Glenn Snyder, in his paper: The 
Balance Of Power And The Balance Of Terror. These concepts would later become 
known as the Stability-Instability Paradox (Onwards known as SISP) 
 
SISP is an offspring of nuclear deterrence theory and therefore also situated within the 
basic framework of realism. It assumes complete rationality, an anarchic world order 
and self-interested states. (Kumar, 2008: 54-55). The basic assumption in SISP is that 
two competing states possessing nuclear weapons and second strike capability will not 
be completely deterred from action towards the other, as the reason for the conflict 
remains unsolved despite the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Due to the fact that both 
states are rational actors, as assumed in realism, no state will use their nuclear weapons 
since a retaliatory strike would be devastating, whereby the possible gains are offset by 
the losses. As a consequence, the threshold for “going nuclear” is high, and a rational 
actor will thus not use his nuclear weapons unless in dire trouble. This is what ensures 
stability in the relation between the contenders. 
 
The main argument of the stability/instability paradox is that this high threshold could 
be exploited to conduct warfare on a smaller scale, as it is not enough to justify nuclear 
retaliation: 
“Because the defender cannot meaningfully threaten massive retaliation in 
the event of local  transgressions by the aggressor, the latter’s inducement 
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to undertake such transgressions is greatly increased” (Brodie 1965, in 
Kumar, 2008: 53). 
and: 
“Lowering the probability that a conventional war will escalate to a 
nuclear war-along  preemptive and other lines - reduces the danger of 
starting a conventional war, thus, this low likelihood of escalation-referred 
to here as ‘stability'- makes conventional war less dangerous, and 
possibly, as a result more likely” (Chari 2003 in Kumar, 2008: 53-54). 
The sub-nuclear actions could, among other things, be proxy wars or limited wars. 
These actions therefore create instability at the lower levels, while the stability on a 
higher level is maintained. Neorealist John Mearsheimer declared that “It is possible 
that nuclear-armed great powers might conclude that it could fight a conventional war 
against a nuclear-armed rival without the war turning nuclear” (Basrur, 2008; 115). 
This would thus justify the state’s search for ever-expanding conventional capabilities.  
 5.4 Stability‐Instability Paradox and Kargil 
“Consequently, it can be argued that the applicability of the stability/instability paradox 
is very obvious in the analysis of the Kargil war. In fact, no other theory can explain 
Kargil, better.”(Kumar, 2008: 72) 
 
The Stability-Instability Paradox was, according to Kumar (2008), the main reason why 
Pakistan instigated the infiltration across the LoC. The Pakistani military command was 
confident that the country’s nuclear arsenal would provide an umbrella under which 
Pakistan could wage low intensity conflicts e.g. proxy-wars in Kashmir, without risking 
nuclear war with India (Ahmed, 2005, 143, Pant, 2008: 75): “'The Indians cannot afford 
to extend the war to other areas in Kashmir, leave aside launching an attack across 
international boundaries 'because of the' risks of nuclear conflagration'” (Senior 
Pakistan official in Ahmed, 2005: 145) 
 
The Stability-Instability Paradox is evident in the way both parts severely restricted 
themselves and their actions. As mentioned earlier, the Indian forces attacked the 
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Pakistanis head on, and restricted their actions to the sector occupied by the Pakistani 
forces, whereby they were not able to bring their numerical superiority to full effect. 
Pakistan, clearly aware of their disadvantage, both numerically and in terms of support, 
did not reinforce their troops and thus kept the conflict at a low level. India did, 
however, mobilize large amounts of troops and ships, but importantly, did not include 
them in the conflict, and did therefore not escalate the conflict further. 
 
Although the Indian air force was very active with air-strikes on Pakistani positions 
(something Musharraf considered out of proportion to the conflict (Joeck, 2009: 133)), 
they were strictly confined to the Indian side of the LoC, even though there were several 
tempting targets such as supply camps, roads etc. on the other side of the LoC. 
Similarly, the Pakistani air-force was kept out of the conflict, leaving their soldiers 
unprotected and at the mercy of the Indian Air force. Again, this is a clear example of 
the SISP, as both countries were cautious of anything that might escalate the conflict, 
and thereby crossing their respective nuclear threshold. 
 
It should here be noted, however, that nuclear pessimists like Neil Joeck (2009) 
disregard the role of deterrence in the conflict. Joeck does instead explaining the 
responses and restrains by the actors as a contest of brinkmanship12. Joeck claims that 
New Delhi was ready to escalate the conflict in spite of the presence of nuclear 
weapons. By mobilising more troops and material than Pakistan, India tried to give an 
impression of no-tolerance, and hereby cancelled Pakistan’s hopes of a fait accompli. 
Joeck is, indeed, rather sceptical towards the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in 
the Kargil conflict, and would rather explain the conflict as a contest of brinkmanship 
(Joeck, 2009: 137-138).  
 
But SISP can also explain why Pakistan insurgents appeared in Indian controlled 
Kashmir in the first place: “It is not a simple coincidence that insurgency exploded in 
Kashmir, in 1989, at almost the same time that Pakistan also acquired nuclear 
capability.” (Kumar, 2008: 60). Some argue, that the nuclear shield provided Pakistan 
                                                             
12 The term diplomatic brinkmanship implies that two states, usually nuclear weapon states, up the ante 
(go to the brink) in the hope that the opponent, fearing that events will spin out of control, will withdraw 
or make concessions (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 53). 
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with the leeway to support the insurgency in Kashmir. In fact, The Kargil Review 
Committee Report, an official Indian review of the crisis noted that the presence of 
nuclear weapons in Pakistan provided the umbrella under which insurgents could be 
supported: ”'Otherwise, it is inconceivable that it could [have] sustain[ed] its proxy war 
against India, inflicting thousands of casualties, without being unduly concerned about 
India's “conventional superiority”'” (The Kargil Review Committee Report cited in 
Basrur, 2008: 59). 
 5.5 Sub‐conclusion  
The Kargil Crisis is noticeable as it was an armed conflict between two nuclear states. 
As the purpose of the nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India is to deter rivals from 
hostile action, it is interesting that Pakistan conducted an armed incursion on Indian 
Territory. By including Glenn Snyder's Stability-Instability Paradox, an alternative 
understanding for the incursion is offered. By exploiting the possibility for action 
underneath the nuclear threshold, Pakistan was capable of pursuing its military and 
political goals in spite of India's nuclear weapons. This furthermore shows that although 
nuclear deterrence might be in place, the origins of the rivalry have not been solved, and 
the states are therefore still pursuing the gains perceived to be within reach. But it can 
plausibly be stated that nuclear deterrence, although creating the leeway for Pakistan to 
launch the incursion, has simultaneously restrained the two states from escalating the 
conflict. However, it is impossible to predict how the situation unfolded, had the states 
not possessed nuclear weapons.  
 
The ability of nuclear deterrence to ensure stability was questioned again two years later 
during the Twin Peak crisis. 
 
5.5.1 The Twin Peak Crisis 
During ten months, from December 2001 to October 2002, South Asia saw one of its 
largest military mobilizations. These tense months are commonly known as the Twin 
peak crisis, referring to two incidents during the period that threatened to throw two 
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nuclear states into a full-fledged war. The Twin Peak Crisis is also known as Operation 
Parakram, the name for the Indian mobilization that followed the first 'peak'. 
 
India has been subjected to several terrorist attacks during the last two decades. 
Especially Islamic jihadists have been active, and more so after the 1999 Kargil war. 
On the 13th December 2001, a small group of militants armed with explosives and small 
arms attacked the Indian parliament. The target was the Indian legislation, including the 
Prime Minister. Although the attack failed and the perpetrators were killed in an intense 
firefight with security forces before they managed to reach the parliament13, the 
symbolic value was huge, and public outrage was enormous. New Delhi quickly 
associated the militants to two terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-
Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, and blamed Islamabad for sponsoring the groups (Nayak 
& Krepon, 2006:15). Indian leaders were forced to act, and orders were issued for a full 
mobilization along the Indian-Pakistan border: the Operation Parakram. The 
mobilization consisted of 500.000 soldiers and three armoured divisions positioned 
along the border, and the air force and navy being put on full alert. Although denying 
any involvement in the terrorist attack, Islamabad responded in kind and positioned 3-
400.000 soldiers along the border (globalsecurity.org, B.) The US was at the time 
occupied with an offensive in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan, and on a US 
request a large amount of Pakistani troops were stationed at the border to intercept any 
Taliban or Al-Qaeda members who tried to escape from Afghanistan. The US was thus 
quite dismayed when Islamabad ordered the troops to the Indian border. As a result, the 
US immediately tried to calm the two rivals down, most likely also due to the fear of an 
eventual war turning nuclear.  
 
In the days that followed the attack, India handed over a list of demands to Pakistan, 
including a requirement to immediately stop militants from crossing the border, to clear 
out terrorist groups based in Pakistan and to hand over 20 named terrorists. In January 
2002 president Musharraf held a speech, wherein he outlawed several terrorist groups, 
including those responsible for the December 13 attack, but refused to hand any 
                                                             
13 Fortunately, an electricity black-out resulted in a meeting being postponed, and there were thus few 
ministers in the vicinity. Furthermore, the terrorists crashed their car, and their cover was therefore blown, 
leading to a gunfight. 
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suspected terrorist over to India. Moreover, he restated Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. The 
speech lowered tensions, but India refused to de-mobilize until they saw clear evidence 
of cross border infiltration being over. In the months that followed, however, militants 
continued to cross the border, and when terrorists struck again in May 2002, the 
tensions flared once again. 
 
The second peak during the standoff occurred when terrorists, dressed as Indian 
soldiers, attacked a camp housing family members of Indian soldiers positioned at the 
border. Both countries were thus once again brought to the brink of war, as India 
mobilized another 200.000 soldiers at the border. Pakistan did, in response, test several 
nuclear capable missiles and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the use of nuclear 
weapons (Raghavan, 2009: 251-252). Subsequently, the Indian prime minister stated 
that: “‘The time has come for a decisive battle.’” (Singh quoted in Raghavan, 
2009:251). But, according to the Indian Army Chief they had at this time, despite the 
numerical superiority lost the military edge in the standoff (Raghavan, 2009: 251). 
 
In June 2002, the US Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage, publicly announced that 
Musharraf had, in a private meeting, reaffirmed his commitment to permanently stop 
cross-border infiltration14. According to a US official, this announcement gave India the 
excuse it needed to pull back from a war it did not want (Nayak & Krepon, 2006: 37). 
Although the situation was stable at the end of June, the Indian troops did not stand 
down until October 2002.  
 
5.5.2 The Twin Peak Crisis and Deterrence 
Although the Twin Peak Crisis did not come to blows it was arguably closer to 
escalation than the Kargil crisis two years earlier. The sheer number of soldiers facing 
each other would have left India little space for action before crossing Pakistan's nuclear 
threshold. In fact, one must assume that India knew that a mobilization of 
approximately 500.000 soldiers along the border would leave few steps untrodden on 
                                                             
14 Musharraf had not the same definition of publicly announcing as the Americans and Indians, and was 
not pleased with them doing so as there was no mentioning of resuming talks on Kashmir,  which  
Armitage and Musharraf had spoken about (Nayak & Krepon, 2006: 36). 
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the escalation ladder. As the terrorists attacks were not enough to warrant a nuclear war, 
it can be assumed that India was confident that the mobilization would not lead to all-
out war or that it could keep any armed struggle below the Pakistani nuclear threshold.  
It is not clear how far India was in fact ready to go when mobilizing (Ragahvan, 2006: 
244-247). In the days following the parliament attack, the political leadership of India 
met with the military high command to discuss the actions to be taken against Pakistan 
and the terrorists. The army chiefs argued that the army was not in position (being in 
peacetime locations) to perform a sub-conventional war, consisting of air strikes and 
special forces operations targeting terrorist training camps on Pakistani soil – something 
they were not too fond of in the first place (Raghavan, 2009, 245). Instead the army 
advocated a full-scale mobilization of the army to get it in positions for future 
operations: 
 
“The army chief, General S. Padmanabhan, subsequently observed that limited 
strikes would have been ‘totally futile’: ‘if you really want to punish someone for 
something very terrible he has done you smash him. You destroy his weapons and 
capture his territory.’”(Raghavan 2009: 245). 
 
The army did not necessarily seek an all-out war with Pakistan, as the army maintained 
that it could capture portions of Pakistani territory and limit, i.e. destroy parts of, 
Pakistan's military capacity without crossing the nuclear threshold ”‘we do not envision 
striking in a way that would lead them to use their nuclear weapons” (Indian official in 
Raghavan, 2009: 246). 
 
The mobilization, whether with a war in mind or not, may seem intriguing as Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons ought to deter any hostile action, but, according to Raghavan: 
 
“Indians, we may recall, held that the presence of nuclear weapons did not negate 
their conventional superiority against Pakistan, but merely made it imperative to 
avoid endangering Pakistan’s vital security interests. From the Indian decision-
makers’ perspective, the military balance weighed in their favour as long as 
Roskilde University 
Global Studies, Autumn 2010  
Maia Juel Giorgio, Tina Søndergård Madsen, Mark Westh, Jakob Wiegersma,  
       
43 | P a g e  
 
certain limits were not crossed. In consequence, their threats would seem credible 
to Pakistan”(Raghavan, 2006: 246). 
 
Furthermore it seemed that India envisaged Pakistan as more deterred by India's nuclear 
weapons than India by Pakistan's. Indeed, according to the Indian defence minister 
George Fernandes: “Pakistan can’t think of using nuclear weapons … We could take a 
strike, survive and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the 
nuclear issue would figure in a conflict.” (Raghavan, 2006: 246). Navy chief, Admiral 
Sureesh Mehta, shared this perspective: “It would be lunacy for them [Pakistan] to start 
one [nuclear war].” 15 (Raghavan, 2006: 246). 
 
It is tempting to conclude that Pakistan failed in ensuring that their nuclear capability 
was strong and/or credible. If it was a common perception among the Indian political 
and military leadership that Pakistan was not a serious nuclear threat it could explain 
why India 'dared' to conduct such a massive build up. 
 
US Secretary of state Colin Powell partly noted this lacking credibility. During a phone 
call with President Musharraf he said:  
 
 '“All this chatter about nuclear weapons is very interesting, but let’s talk 
 general-to-general. You know and I know that you can’t possibly use nuclear 
 weapons….It’s really an existential weapon that [sic] not been used since 1945. 
 So stop scaring everyone.”' (Powell quoted in Nayak & Krepon, 2006:32).  
 
However, several scholars have questioned whether the mobilization was in fact thought 
through. In “Operation Parakram: the war unfinished” Sood and Sawhney compares 
Operation Parakram to a “knee jerk reaction” and claims it was a reaction to domestic 
pressure to do something “equally spectacular” (Swami, 2009: 153).  
 
                                                             
15 It deserves being mentioned that by downplaying India's fright of Pakistan’s capabilities, they solidified 
their own (at least outwardly) determination to enforce their rhetoric with action. 
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Focusing on the sheer scale of the mobilisation, an interesting aspect comes into play. 
Considering that India prepared for a war of such a scale that it would require almost all 
of Pakistan's conventional force to withstand (a feat that would even then be difficult for 
Pakistan), Pakistan might quickly have felt cornered and compelled towards using their 
nuclear weapons. India’s “jump” up the escalation ladder might either have been an ill-
considered notion of acting decisively and resolutely, or actually is precisely what India 
aimed at. By leaving little or no room for the conflict to escalate further (a variation of 
Nixon's Mad-man theory16, if you will) the international community, mainly the US, 
would hopefully feel compelled to intervene on India's part. Furthermore, recognising 
that India, aware of the proximity to Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, continued its 
preparation for war, Pakistan would be in no doubt of India's resolve. That was, at least, 
what India hoped for. However, India's attempt at coercing Pakistan failed, as Pakistan 
resolutely counter-mobilized and refused to bow down. It thus turned out to be a 
textbook example of brinkmanship. That the mobilization was an attempt at 
brinkmanship is reinforced as both states, in spite of the massive build-up, showed 
considerable restraint during the standoff. It is noticeable that none of them placed their 
troops in “offensive positions”, but kept them in defensive positions.17  
 
5.5.3 Sub­Conclusion 
India has arguably become a victim of its own designs. When India went overtly nuclear 
in 1998 Pakistan followed suit. Unfortunately India has since then been incapable of 
bringing its conventional superiority to bear, as this to a large extent has been countered 
by Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This was exemplified in the 2001-2002 standoff, when 
India, in spite of its conventional superiority, was deterred from launching any 
offensives against conventionally inferior Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, has on 
several occasions instigated limited and proxy wars with India, and has been protected 
from any major retaliation by its nuclear capability. Thus: “While the acquisition of a 
                                                             
16 ”[…] Nixon, called the Madman Theory, or "the principle of the threat of excessive force." Nixon was 
convinced that his power would be enhanced if his opponents thought he might use excessive force, even 
nuclear force. That, coupled with his reputation for ruthlessness, he believed, would suggest that he was 
dangerously unpredictable.” (nuclearfiles.org) 
17 An Indian commander was even disciplined when his troops strayed too close to the border (Basrur, 
2008;63 Raghavan 2009: 249)  
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nuclear deterrent has freed Pakistan’s hand in the use of force against India, it is 
simultaneously placed severe constraints on the use of force by India to counter 
Pakistan” (Sahni, 2007: 194). Additionally, it is important to note the propensity of the 
combatants to repeatedly restrain themselves whenever there was a crisis.  
 
It can thus with reasonable certainty be concluded that the SiSP has come to its fullest in 
the case of India and Pakistan. Although enhancing stability on the higher levels, 
manifested in the absence of large-scale conventional wars, nuclear deterrence has 
created instability at the lower levels of the conflict, and has among other things caused 
leeway for the 1999 Pakistan intrusion and the 2001-2002 Parakram crisis.   
6   The Influence of Domestic Actors 
Having analysed the significance of the Kargil and Parakram crises for the stability 
created by nuclear deterrence, we will now turn to the influence of domestic actors on 
the conflict. As indicated in the previous chapter, domestic actors, in the form of 
militant groups, were able to seriously threaten the stability in the region on the lower 
levels. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant disagreement between the Pakistani 
civil leadership and the military apparatus on how to approach the conflict. This chapter 
therefore seeks to go in depth with the role and influence of these two domestic actors 
(the militant groups and the military) and their affect on the stability between India and 
Pakistan, and thus ultimately on the stability of nuclear deterrence.  6.1 The Neoclassical Realist Approach 
From what has been presented so far, it is evident that neoclassical realists, in contrast to 
neorealists, emphasize the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy making of 
states. However, it is yet to be specified exactly which domestic actors can be influential 
and under what circumstances. Neoclassical realist Norrin M. Ripsman puts forward 
several criteria that domestic actors must fulfill in order to gain influence in policy 
making.  
In his assessment of which actors may be able to gain influence Ripsman distinguishes 
between democratic and non-democratic states, and he claims that the influence of 
domestic actors will differ depending on this determinant.  
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6.2 Is Pakistan Democratic?  
Formally, Pakistan is a democratic state with a democratically elected Prime Minister 
and a parliament consisting of a Senate and a National Assembly (Government of 
Pakistan). In 2008 the Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) won the majority of the votes in 
the elections and Yusuf Raza Gilani was appointed head of the coalition government. In 
September the same year Ali Asif Zardari won an overwhelming majority of the votes in 
the Parliament and was thereby elected President. Zardari was elected shortly after he, 
together with Gilani, had threatened former President Musharraf with a charge of 
impeachment, which was the major cause for Musharraf’s resignation. To sum up, this 
could indicate that Pakistan is heading towards democracy. However, according to 
Philip Oldenburg, author of the book “India, Pakistan and Democracy – solving the 
puzzle of divergent paths” this label is not easily given. In fact, he argues that Pakistan 
is not democratic: “It [democracy] has only been restored as a façade for military 
bureaucratic rule for brief periods since then [Independence], including the present” 
(Oldenburg, 2010: 1). Others support this claim, describing the Pakistani system as 
“military-bureaucratic authoritarianism” (Jalal, 1995: 249). Indeed, as we will 
elaborate below there is a rather uneven distribution of power between the military 
establishment and the democratically elected leaders. Consequently, the military is 
granted a disproportional amount of power. If democracy implies fulfilling two criteria, 
free elections and separation of powers: “that no other power (such as the military) can 
veto decisions made by elected rulers “(Oldenburg, 2010: 4) then Pakistan can hardly 
be called a democracy as it has difficulties living up to the latter. Nonetheless, the 
question of whether Pakistan is a democracy or not is controversial. As it is not the main 
aim to explore this issue here, it suffices to conclude that there are indicators pointing 
towards the fact that Pakistan may not yet be democratic, only two years after the 
military regime resigned.   6.3 Ripsman and the Significance of Domestic Actors 
In line with neoclassical realism’s notion of the power seeking individual, Ripsman 
argues that the primary aim of individuals comprising the executive is merely to sustain 
and enhance their own individual power status or position in a hierarchical order. Only 
after this aim is ensured the focus will be turned towards the preferred policy agenda of 
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the executive (Ripsman, 2009: 181). It is thus, first and foremost, those domestic actors 
who are able to ensure the power of the policy-makers that are most likely to be 
influential in shaping policy decisions. First of all, Ripsman asserts that a domestic actor 
must be in a position to either reward or punish the policy-makers if they do not comply 
with the given domestic actor’s demands. In a non-democratic state this implies that the 
domestic actor must be able to “[…] preserve the leader’s position or topple him/her” 
(Ripsman, 2009: 181). Secondly, Ripsman claims that policy-makers, due to their 
craving for power, will be prone to accommodate the demands of domestic groups “that 
have the capability to lead a coup or organize revolt against the regime” (Ripsman, 
2009: 183). Ripsman mentions the military as such a domestic actor. In extension to 
this, Ripsman argues that a heavily charged public sentiment that could result in 
uncontrollable public unrest is also a factor that can influence the policy choices of the 
executive. Thus, if internal unrest is high and if it directly threatens the power position 
of the policy-maker, the executive will seek to minimize hostilities by accommodating 
public demands (Ripsman, 2009: 183).  
Even though personal power may be of primary concern the political agenda is still of 
significance. Thus, if a domestic actor is relatively powerful it might be able to obstruct 
the agenda of the executive. In Ripsman’s words such actors (e.g. the military) can “ 
[…] manipulate their power to obstruct to extract policy concessions” (Ripsman, 2009: 
185). Finally, domestic actors may gain substantial influence if they are successful in 
shaping the national interest. As will be elaborated upon below this last point, however, 
is, according to Ripsman, rarely plausible.  
Moreover, Ripsman focuses on the notion of autonomy. The level of autonomy of the 
executive is determined by its isolation from the legislature or, in a non-democratic 
state, its isolation from societal elites and institutions. Put differently, an executive is 
autonomous if it is capable of enforcing decisions without being strained to incorporate 
demands from domestic groups. He argues that domestic actors will have relatively low 
influence in a state with a highly autonomous national-security policy executive. 
Domestic actor’s influence is thus to a high degree determined by the level of executive 
autonomy (Ripsman, 2009: 190). 
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To sum up on Ripsman’s argumentation, domestic actors are most likely to be 
influential in policy making if they are (a) powerful enough to topple the executive, (b) 
able to reward the policy-makers if these choose to listen to the articulated demands or 
(c) successful in shaping the national interest and obstruct the agenda of the executive 
for the benefit of their own agenda.   6.4 Military Influence on Pakistani Foreign Policy 
Pakistan has been under military control during a major part of its history. In fact the 
country has been subjected to military rule three times since 1947 – from 1958-1971, 
again from 1977-1988 and finally from 1999-2008. Pakistan is often characterized as a 
politically fragile country due to its history of military coups and recurrent declarations 
of martial law (Born et al, 2010: 223). After the resignation of Musharraf in 2008, 
Pakistan was again subjected to civil leadership and is now, as mentioned above, ruled 
by Ali Asif Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Notwithstanding this shift 
towards increased civil control, the military continues to be influential in policymaking, 
especially in decisions concerning nuclear-, foreign-, and national security policy 
(Cheema, 2010: 207; and Rashid, 2010). The military’s influence in these areas is, for 
example, evident in the composition of the National Command Authority (NCA), first 
put forward by Musharraf in 2000. The NCA is “comprised of both military and civilian 
representatives tasked with managing and coordinating nuclear weapon development, 
use and C4I ”18 (Cheema, 2010: 203). At the time of Musharraf’s presentation of the 
NCA, there was widespread reluctance from the part of the Parliament to accept the 
civil-military structure of the NCA, as this would grant the military increased control 
over Pakistan’s nuclear forces and strategy. Today, however, the NCA is a formalized 
body (Cheema, 2010: 223). The influence of the military will be further elaborated 
below.  
According to documents leaked by Wikileaks Zardari fears a military coup and has 
appointed a successor in the case of his assassination. In fact he “has made extensive 
preparations in case of his own assassination” (NDTV, 2010). Furthermore, Musharraf 
has recently stated, that Pakistan is currently facing the prospect of yet another military 
coup. He argues that Zardari has been unable to respond efficiently to escalating 
                                                             
18 Command, control, communications, computerization and intelligence network (Born et al, 2010: 200) 
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extremist militant activities and a disintegrating economy (Dawn.com, 2010). Cf. a 
newly leaked US cable, Zardari himself does in fact admit that the Pakistani 
government is loosing the fight against the Taliban: “I’m sorry to say this but we are not 
winning [the war against the Taliban]”, Zardari is reported to have written (NDTV, 
2010).  
Thus, judging from the history of military coups and the prospects of yet another coup 
on the Zardari government, it would seem as though the military consistently poses a 
threat to the existing regime. Applying Ripsman’s frame of reference, this may be the 
reason why the state leadership grants the military a rather substantial influence in 
important policy areas. Also, as we might recall, Ripsman asserts that domestic actors 
will be able to gain greater influence if they are capable of either rewarding or 
punishing policy-makers. The numerous coups conducted by the military can be seen as 
such punishment as it has been argued that the military has been eager to control 
Pakistani politics because it has found the civil leadership inadequate in dealing with 
questions of national security and the (conventional and nuclear) threat posed by India 
(Britannica, B).  
Before assessing the different ways in which the military has influenced foreign policy 
decisions, it can be beneficial to further explore how this organization operates and its 
preferences. This will have consequences for how it influences foreign policy and more 
specifically the conflict with India. 6.5 The Military’s Link to Militants in Kashmir  
It is important to stress that there are different fractions of militants or jihadist groups 
operating in Pakistan and that these different groups have different agendas and 
relations to the military. The Taliban militants who are vehemently opposed to the 
governments “pro-American” agenda, often engage in violent clashes with the military 
and have planned and committed numerous suicide attacks on government and military 
goals. Moreover, when the Taliban took over the Swat valley in 2008 and imposed 
Sharia law, the military launched a large offensive to regain control of the valley. The 
militants in Kashmir, on the other hand, have so far refrained from turning against the 
military and the government. Contrary to the Taliban, these militant groups are heavily 
Roskilde University 
Global Studies, Autumn 2010  
Maia Juel Giorgio, Tina Søndergård Madsen, Mark Westh, Jakob Wiegersma,  
       
50 | P a g e  
 
dependent upon the support, or at least tolerance, of the military (Oldenburg, 2010: 
208).  
 
There are several indicators that point towards a connection between the military and 
the militants in Kashmir, both in the past and presently. When Musharraf seized power 
soon after the Kargil crisis, jihadi violence in Jammu and Kashmir increased 
dramatically (Swami, 2009; 148). In a recent interview Musharraf admitted that 
Pakistan, during his time in government, did in fact train militants to fight against India 
(Spiegel online, 2010). Additionally, during his time, the military leadership had close 
ties with militants such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and “[…] backed the group as a 
surrogate force against India” (Perlez, 2009). The link between the Pakistani military 
and the militants is further enhanced by the testimony of David Coleman Headley19, a 
Pakistani-American who earlier this year admitted being influential in planning the 
26/11 Mumbai bombings in 2008. But more interestingly, Headley admitted that he had 
shared information on possible terror-targets within India, not only with the Lashkar-e-
Taiba but also with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI operates directly 
under the military as its director-general is appointed by the Chief of Army Staff. Even 
though it is formally answerable to the Prime Minister, the ISI is by and large controlled 
by the military (Cohen et al., 2010). Thus, Headley’s statement provides a direct link 
between militant organisations and the Pakistani military (represented by the ISI). 
However, the extent of current military support for militants is a highly disputed 
question and difficult to either prove or refute. Nonetheless, with the history of the 
military-militant ties in mind, the possibility that the military is in fact still connected to 
organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba seems plausible. As previously established, 
the military is highly influential in Pakistani policy making. If the militants, on the other 
hand, are conceived as an autonomous domestic group, they do not have any direct 
influence on the shaping of policy decisions. However, if they are conceived as being 
attached to the military, they may exert influence indirectly by aiming to promote a 
certain political agenda nationally. Ultimately, the primary goal for militant groups such 
as the Lashkar-e-Taiba is the defeat of India in Kashmir (BBC, B). As we will now 
                                                             
19 Headley´s story is one of the most recent developments in the investigation of the 26/11 Mumbai 
attacks.  
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explore further, this goal seems to have been implemented in the military preference of 
maintaining focus on the conflict with India. 
 6.6 Conflicting Preferences 
With regards to differing preferences between the military and the civil leadership, Scott 
Sagan argues that military preferences are not an expression of the national interest but 
do rather reflect organisational biases:  
 
 “[...] professional military organizations- because of common biases, inflexible 
 routines, and parochial interests-display organisational behaviours that are likely 
 to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war.”(Sagan, 1995: 48). 
Indeed, military leaders will act according to a sort of bounded rationality deriving from 
their organizational standpoint and thus possibly make foreign policy decisions that are 
irrational, as they do not include broader considerations relating to the national interest. 
Military actors will tend to “[...] focus on their narrow set of responsibilities, which 
limits their perspective and often produces very narrow definitions of success and 
victory” (Sagan, 1995: 125).   With this claim Sagan crosses swords with Waltz who, as 
described above, completely dismisses the notion that state behavior in the international 
system is in any way determined by domestic matters, such as biases of the leaders and 
organizational affiliations (Sagan, 1995: 51).  
 
6.6.1 Military preferences 
Following Sagan’s logic, the military will seek to maximize its own utility and thus 
fulfill its own interests in order to preserve its prerogatives as far as possible. This 
implies that the military will seek to accumulate the largest possible share of the budget 
and stock of resources, e.g. weapons and staff (Sagan, 2003: 64). In Pakistan, defence 
spending has increased from $5.13bn to $6.41bn – an increase of $1.28bn from the 
previous budget. According to Pakistani Journalist Ahmed Rashid, this augmentation 
occurred at the expense of the government’s budget “for development, education and 
health” (Rashid, 2010). Furthermore, the military has recently presented a “wish-list” to 
the US asking for i.e. “helicopter gunships and drone technology” (Haider, 2010). 
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Supporting Sagan’s view of the military, Husain Haqqani, director of Boston 
University's Center for International Relations states: 
  
 “The military wants to continue not only to spend on better equipment but for 
 more privileges  for itself. So if you go to Pakistan, the best neighborhoods are 
 the military neighborhoods.  They're called defense housing estates. Nowhere else 
 in the world does the military get  involved in large-scale business as the 
 Pakistani military has” (NPR, 2007). 
 
But, as stated above military interests can also be expressed in more indirect ways. The 
military primarily continues to prioritize the alleged security problem posed by India 
(Rashid, 2009). According to Stephen Cohen, scholar in India-Pakistani security issues, 
the Pakistani military continues to “see things through an India-tinted lens” (Cohen et 
al, 2009), which has the consequence that all security issues seem to be connected to 
India in one way or another. It can be argued that this tenacious focus on India serves 
the parochial interests of the military as the insistence on such an enemy-image gives 
legitimacy to continued military influence on foreign- and security policy. In this 
respect, Sagan argues that the military will often “be biased towards offensive 
operations, to resist civilian interference in professional matters” (Rajagopalan, 2007: 
274).  
 
Additionally, India might be representing a sort of wounded pride for the military, as it 
was more or less due to Indian endeavor that Pakistan was cut in half in the 1971 
Bangladesh war, which completely undermined Pakistani military efforts to hinder the 
secession (Cohen et al. 2009). Similarly, the repeated clashes on the Siachen glacier in 
the 1980’s also manifested the inferiority of the Pakistani military to India, as India 
finally managed to acquire control of the glacier in spite of several Pakistani attempts to 
do the same and to defeat the Indian forces (Basrur, 2008: 50). These examples indicate 
that the Pakistani military may be holding on to the notion of the Indian threat due to 
Pakistan’s history of defeat to India and more specifically due to the history of the 
Pakistani military’s inferiority to the Indian military. As was the case with Kargil in 
1999 this history has made the military want to seek revenge. It can be argued that 
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maintaining an image of India as the accumulation of all evil may help to legitimize 
aggression such as the infiltration of Kargil. 
 
In the cases where the military supports militant groups, these can be seen as merely an 
extension of the military and thus serving the interests of this. The enduring resistance 
of militant groups in Kashmir goes well in line with the military’s aim of maintaining 
focus on the conflict and thus maintaining the picture of an unremitting enemy. I.e. the 
involvement of the ISI in the 2008 Mumbai bombings and its ties to the militant 
organization Lashkar-e-Taiba during this event underlines the bias towards maintaining 
a relatively tough line with India on the Kashmir issue. Applying Ripsman’s logic, the 
military’s high degree of influence on Pakistani politics could be explained by its 
attempts to define the national interest as the maintenance of an offensive stance against 
India, perceiving this as the largest threat to Pakistan’s integrity and survival.  
 
6.6.2 Preferences of the civilian leadership 
The civil leadership, on the other hand, seems to be adopting a more pro-western 
approach as current President Ali Asif Zardari often proclaims his commitment to fight 
Pakistani based militants and generally claims that he wants a more peaceful 
relationship with India. His commitment to this is widely supported by the US that sees 
Pakistan as its ally in the fight against terrorism (Sciutto, 2009). In 2008, he took a 
drastic turn away from former government’s customary discourse as he referred to the 
militants operating in Kashmir as “terrorists” and not “freedom-fighters” as they have 
previously been labelled. Moreover, he banned the Jama’at ut Dawa, an organization 
that has been accused of having close ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba (Loudon, 2008). 
 
Although Zardari often states that the top priority of his government is the socio-
economic development of the country (Daily Times, 2010) it would be misleading to 
conclude that Zardari is unambiguously aiming towards this end. He has, on several 
occasions, been accused of not doing enough to relief the millions of victims of the 
floods earlier this year. The international society has been reluctant to send relief-aid to 
Pakistan due to allegations of comprehensive corruption within the government. In fact:  
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“The government has declined to carry out a cabinet reshuffle, root out corruption, 
set up civilian task forces to carry out flood relief or create transparent mechanisms 
for dispersing Pakistani and Western aid for the floods despite overwhelming public 
demand.” (Rashid, 2010).  
Regardless of Zardari’s true intentions it is clear that what he (officially) expresses as 
being the top priority for Pakistan differs significantly from the aims of the military. 
Having elucidated the conflicting preferences, it is now interesting to assess in which 
way the consequences of the influence from domestic actors has affected the conflict 
between India and Pakistan. 
 6.7 The Consequences of Military Influence for Indo‐Pak Relations  
Firstly, as mentioned above, the military continues to portray India as Pakistan ultimate 
archenemy. This stance is conflicting to President Zardari’s who, probably due to the 
pressure from the international society, emphasises targeting terrorist organisations 
operating from within the country. Noting that the military has been connected to 
organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, they express no will of prioritizing this over 
the conflict with India:  
 
“It [the military] dictates the government's foreign and national security policy, 
and has stymied attempts by the civilian government to […] clamp down on the 
Lashkar-e-Toiba, the most powerful militant group in the country that allegedly 
carried out the Mumbai attacks of 2008 in which 174 people were killed.” 
(Rashid, 2010). 
 
The unwillingness of the military to deal firmly with militant organisations can also be 
perceived as an indirect support for these. Terrorist attacks carried out on Indian soil or 
in Indian held Kashmir has previously been perceived as giving rise to crises such as 
Parakram in 2001-02 and has thus created tensions and cold air between the adversaries. 
Moreover, in 2008, shortly before the bombings “The Home Secretaries of India and 
Pakistan met in Islamabad and agreed to begin cooperating against terrorism and to 
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bring the Federal Bureau of Investigations of Pakistan and the Central Bureau of 
Investigation of India in close contact to that end.” (Nawaz, 2008). However, the attacks 
on the parliament in New Delhi completely impeded the peace process and did thus 
once again cause tensions and regression.  
 
The internal disagreements within Pakistan seem to have the consequence that the 
country is not acting unitarily in decisions on foreign policy. According to Sagan, the 
government leaders are “[...] intending to behave rationally, yet sees their beliefs, the 
options available to them, and the final implementation of their decisions as being 
influenced by powerful forces within the country” (Sagan, 2003: 50-51). It is obvious 
that there is more than one centre of power and that the different centres have equally 
different agendas. The lack of unity and the consequences of this for foreign policy 
decisions were, as outlined above, evident in the decisions Pakistan made during the 
Kargil crisis. The crisis displayed a situation in which the military and the civil 
leadership held markedly different views as to how to approach the situation (Cf. 
Chapter 5). Additionally, prior to the crisis in 1998, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee signed the Lahore-agreement – a peace 
agreement that pledged them to “"intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including 
the issue of Jammu and Kashmir"” (BBC, C). However, when Pakistani troops 
infiltrated Kargil in 1999, the Lahore agreements were cancelled. Musharraf, who at 
that time was Chief of Army Staff, was the architect behind this infiltration, which 
according to Sharif himself took place without his knowledge and consent (Dittmer, 
2005: 242). Not only does this example display differing opinions on how to approach 
the conflict with India, it also shows the consequences on stability that the military 
influence has had.  
 
As mentioned above, the militant groups have not directly been able to exert influence 
on foreign policy making, but they have had an indirect impact through the ties to the 
military. However, as we will now develop, Pakistani militants may, quite paradoxically, 
have had a substantial influence on Indian foreign policy as terrorist attacks committed 
by e.g. the LeT have several times resulted in New Delhi taking action against Pakistan. 
In this respect, it is worth noticing that India has conceived terrorist attacks as an 
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expression of Pakistani aggression and not as aggression from independent domestic 
groups. Thus, India asserts that Pakistan has acted unitarily and that the attacks by the 
LeT are merely expressions of state behaviour.    
 
Indeed, terror attacks carried out by Pakistani militants have dramatically determined 
the course of Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. In 2001, for example, the 
attempted terror attack on the Indian parliament created a public outrage and a 
sentiment by Pakistan of wanting revenge on India. Thus, the government was under 
substantial pressure and one of the reasons for the extensive mobilization of forces 
under the operation Parakram was the need to accommodate this pressure. As expressed 
by Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh, Operation Parakram was an attempt to “contain 
the national mood of ‘teach Pak[istan] a lesson’” (Raghavan, 2009: 247). Similarly, 
following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India did in fact contemplate significant retaliation, 
but ultimately abstained from this due to the risk of conflict escalation into nuclear war 
(Narang, 2010). 
 
Moreover, the impact of the Pakistani terrorist organisations (and thus indirectly or 
directly the Pakistani military) on Indian foreign policy making is clear when 
considering India’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine. Although still in the making, it 
allows the military to respond immediately to Pakistani provocations, and was largely 
the result of the inability of the Indian army to respond to the 2001 Parliament attack 
(Karnad, 2007: 93-94).  
 
”[The doctrine] envisions prepositioning holding [sic] and  armored units closer 
to the international border to enable surprise offensives against Pakistan from a 
‘cold start.’ The aim is to reduce Indian mobilization times to enable the Indian 
military to rapidly achieve limited objectives below Pakistan's nuclear threshold 
and before international pressure forces Indian offensives to halt.” (Narang, 2010) 
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This necessity for swift action does not only deny the Pakistani leadership time to act, 
but also takes decision-making out of the hands of the Indian civil leadership20. Hereby 
calm and cautious political statesmanship is circumvented. The control of escalation is 
as a result placed in the hands of the military on both sides, organisations that, 
according to Sagan, have a tendency to pursue limited tactical goals and not overall 
strategic ends. This could prove to be rather dangerous (Narang, 2010). If the Indian 
military had responded immediately to the 2001 attempted terrorist attacks in New 
Delhi there is no saying as to how the conflict would have evolved. The relatively long 
response time allowed the Indian leadership to assess the seriousness of this rather 
critical situation and instigate in diplomacy and statesmanship (Raghavan, 2009: 251). 
 
To sum up, it is clear that militant groups have had a huge influence on the course of 
events in the conflict, both during military and civil leadership. Furthermore, in the 
times of civil rule the military has been highly influential in foreign policy decisions.  
 6.8 The Importance of the International Factors for the Conflict 
While acknowledging the influence domestic actors could exercise, structural 
international determinates should not be disregarded. In fact, in order to express all 
nuances of the neoclassical realist enterprise (their theorising of structural and domestic 
factors), an example will be offered to show how international pressures could, together 
with domestic factors, interplay in influencing foreign policy. The example of 2001 will 
be used, as the international pressure upon Pakistan was particularly noticeable at the 
moment.  
Ripsman has developed a framework for understanding when the international pressure 
is of importance. Ripsman states that when the state is subjected to a high-threat 
environment21 internationally, it will be confronted with essential security issues and 
consequently neglect domestic actors: “when the margin of error is minimal, the 
                                                             
20 The military leaders would most likely pressure the civil leadership for action stressing the importance 
of swift action that ”could allow military logic to outpace political deliberation. ” (Narang, 2010) 
21 Ripsman does not explicitly define a high-threat environment, but does oppose it to a low-threat 
environment. Understanding Ripsman´s theoretical framework (primacy to structural factors) one could 
deduce that by threat, he implies that the survival of the state is threatened. 
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national security executive will have powerful incentives to ignore domestic political 
interest and formulate security policy with the overriding goal of securing the state” 
(Ripsman, 2009: 188). Thus, when international pressure is high, domestic issues will, 
by necessity, be disregarded. He does on the other hand argue that during a low-threat 
environment, domestic actors tend to be more important. Furthermore, Ripsman 
nuances, adding that under specific circumstances of internal turbulence that could 
threaten the position of the executive as such, domestic factors could in fact compete 
with international pressures for influencing foreign-policy: “when public sentiment is so 
completely charged and leaders fear a revolution or widespread unrest, leaders may 
change or tailor their policies to public preferences” (Ripsman, 2009: 183). Thus, even 
in a situation of high-threat, domestic factors could influence state behaviour. 
In Pakistan, a rupture came in 2001 after the terrorist attacks on New York City, 
Washington DC, and the parliament in New Delhi, as international pressure was 
immediately put on Musharraf to end the violence of the terror-organisations operating 
in the eastern and western part of the country22. Consequently, Musharraf dramatically 
changed his policies regarding militancy in Kashmir and Pakistani Talibans. The 
pressure was mainly channelled through the US who proclaimed that al- Qaeda was 
located under the protection of the Afghan Taliban government, which in turn had 
connections to the Pakistani Taliban. The US exercised pressure on Pakistan through the 
articulation of the “war against terror”, the “with us or against us” discourse, and more 
generally through the increasing attention to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist 
groups in Pakistan (Oldenburg, 2010; 165).  
The US president George Bush and Musharraf did in 2001 initiate a transnational 
relationship, where the latter complied with the demands of defeating terrorists 
announced by the former. In fact, Musharraf, faced with the prospect of seriously 
upsetting the US and the risk of being imposed further sanctions, promised to take a 
tough line with terrorists and stated that Pakistan would “’not allow its soil to be used 
by terrorists’” (Swami in Ganguly and Kapur, 2009: 162). Indeed, “Pakistan announced 
                                                             
22 As has been developed earlier, the militants in the eastern and western part should be distinguished. 
Nonetheless, some argue that they are connected:“Given that many of the Islamist terrorist groups 
operating in Jammu and Kashmir were intimately linked to al-Qaeda, the United States may have 
welcomed Indian coercive pressure for Musharraf to act against them”(Swami, 2009;154) 
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that it would join the global coalition against terrorism and offered immediate tangible 
aid to include military bases” (Collins, 2008; 6). Moreover, the reason for the Pakistani 
willingness to conform to the US demands of confrontation with terrorism could be 
explained by Pakistan’s need for resources and political support in its contest with India 
(Collins, 2008: 2). Pakistan made agreements with the US concerning military and 
intelligence support, allowing the US to establish facilities and provide military 
personnel. Furthermore, the US was granted access to military bases (Collins, 2008; 7). 
Pakistan has traditionally been an ally of the United States23. But, interestingly, during 
the period before 9/11, the relation between Pakistan and the US had been estranged due 
to several imposed sanctions on Pakistan, mainly caused by the country´s development 
of a nuclear program. These sanctions lead to increasing economic debt and 
vulnerability of Pakistan, who previously had depended upon US economic generosity 
(Oldenburg, 2010: 165). 
The relation did, however, ameliorate when the sanctions were lifted in 2002, as 
Pakistan expressed willingness to cooperate. In fact, Pakistan profited economically by 
the upheaval of the sanctions “Musharraf´s 2001 U-turn solved Pakistan’s immediate 
economic problems” (Oldenburg, 2010; 165) Moreover, since Musharraf complied with 
US demands in 2001, the US has continued to support Pakistan economically and 
militarily: “Over the past ten years, Washington has spent almost six billion dollars on 
the FATA, 96 percent of them on military activity, and just 1 percent on 
development”(Gregory in Cohen et al., 2010).  
Thus, the dramatic change in policy by Musharraf with the adoption of a rather harsh 
line towards terrorism within the country could imply that Pakistan was subjected to 
international pressure and a high-threat environment, mainly from the US. 
Recalling Ripsman’s theory, which implies that in circumstances of high-threat, 
domestic actors should matter less, this is confirmed in the Pakistani example. Indeed, 
                                                             
23 Indeed, the US had previously supported the Pakistani military during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, where Pakistan had been the main ally to contain Soviet expansion (Collins, 2008; 2). Some 
argue that this influence was constant “Whether it is the military in office or some form of electoral 
democracy, Pakistan has always been a client state of the US, except possibly in the period of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto”(Oldenburg, 2010; 164).  
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Pakistan did conform to international pressures by neglecting, limiting and openly 
defeating domestic actors, and thus diminishing their influence by acknowledging the 
structural international pressure.  
Nonetheless, other empirical data indicate that the international pressure was not the 
only force at play. In fact, controversy reigns over the extent to which Musharraf 
actually complied with international demands. Indeed, many agree on a more modest 
account of President Musharraf’s willingness to support the US agenda. Firstly, some 
claim that the flow of militants into Kashmir did not decrease in the following years, 
which could indicate that the engagement of Musharraf was weak. In an interview with 
the Washington Post in 2002, officers from the Pakistani military even stated that: 
“support for insurgents fighting in Kashmir remained central to Pakistan’s strategy” 
(Basrur, 2008: 62). Secondly, Musharraf may have done little to reduce their activities: 
“While Pakistan did indeed arrest several senior members of terrorist groups operating 
against India, their infrastructure remained untouched” (Kapur, 2009; 151) Bush 
pronounced his dissatisfaction in 2002, referring to Musharraf: “We and other are 
making it clear to him that he must live up to his word” (Swami, 2009; 152).  
Musharraf´s reticence can be explained by domestic instabilities. Musharraf´s promise 
to the US did in fact create outrage among several of the militant groups within the 
country and resulted in direct attempts on his life (Swami in Ganguly and Kapur, 2009: 
155). Thus, even though the military government under Musharraf did initially support 
organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as a weapon in the conflict with India, 
when Musharraf (officially) changed his politics, it soon became evident that these 
organisations who “had backed his rise to power, and his nation’s superpower patron” 
(Swami, 2009: 154) had a will of their own and had no intentions of blindly obeying 
government orders. It is difficult to evaluate if what Ripsman refers to as a charged 
public sentiment was at play or not, but it is clear that internal disagreements24 could 
have inhibited Musharraf from responding whole-heartedly to the international pressure. 
                                                             
24 As has been developed, the relation between the military and militancy is diffuse in Pakistan. Moreover, 
the anti American movement in the country is strong, which could have inhibited Musharraf: “Pakistanis 
are more anti-American than almost any people in the world” (Oldenburg: 2010; 163). 
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Some note that Pakistan is, on the basis of these complex pressures “[…] a vulnerable 
ally in the war on terror”(Ganguly, 2009:151), and Musharraf has even been described 
as “[…] walking a tightrope as he has sought to balance demands from the US to crack 
down on extremism in Pakistan and the demands from an increasingly vocal and anti-
American constituency.” (BBC, D)  
Thus, a complex picture appears. Ripsman offers a framework for understanding the 
limits of structural as well as domestic pressures, which is clearly reflected in the 
example above. It is clear that no factor can be taken into account independently. 
Indeed, Musharraf’s decisions may have emerged from a complex set of international 
pressure, and could partly have been conditioned by the domestic pressure. Recalling 
one of the main notions of neoclassical realism this example is particularly fruitful for 
understanding the interaction between structural and domestic factors: “[…] 
international imperatives [are] filtered through the medium of state structure” (Lobell, 
et. al, 2009: 3). 6.9 Sub‐conclusion 
The Pakistani military has been influential within important domains such as nuclear-, 
security-, and foreign policy. Ripsman argues that the amount of influence is, among 
other factors, determined by the domestic actor’s capability to threaten the very 
foundation of the government executive. This seems to have been the case in Pakistan 
as the military several times has shown its capability to topple the government and is 
currently threatening the Zardari government. Moreover, the question of whether 
militant groups, mainly in Kashmir, are connected to the military is crucial, as this 
implies an indirect influence by the militants. The connection can nonetheless not be 
established with certainty, but as explored above, several indicators point in that 
direction. 
In the India-Pakistan conflict it seems that the conflicting preferences, such as the 
disagreement on whether or not to maintain focus on India as the primary concern for 
the state, have had substantial consequences. E.g. in 1999 the disagreements resulted in 
an abrupt end to the Lahore peace talks between India and Pakistan, due to Musharraf’s 
initiation of the infiltration in Kargil that, allegedly, took place without the complete 
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knowledge of former Prime Minister Sharif. The influence of militant groups (and thus 
perhaps also the military) on the course of events was evident in 2008 when the 26/11 
Mumbai attacks put an end to the tentative peace talks.  
Finally, within the frame of neoclassical realism, the impact of international structural 
pressures on domestic influence in policy decisions has been explored. As is evident 
from the situation after 2001 and Musharraf’s reluctance to respond whole-heartedly to 
the pressure from the US, it seems fair to conclude that domestic actors continue to be 
relevant, even though they may in a high threat environment, at least officially, be 
tamed by the executive.  
 
7   Conclusion 
To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? 
 
Recalling the logical structure of the paper, we here wish to reconcile the three analyses 
and offer a coherent synthesis of the results in relation to the research question. In order 
to gather the threads it is beneficial to shortly reflect upon the main results of the three 
analyses.   
 
Firstly, the aim with the thesis was to explore if there is nuclear deterrence between 
India and Pakistan, based upon Waltz three requirements. After having undertaken this 
analysis, we can conclude that Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear deterrence are 
in fact fulfilled in both countries. Thus, from a neorealist perspective, is it then possible 
to deduce that stability reigns between India and Pakistan as a result of nuclear 
deterrence? Taking a point of departure in neorealist assumptions and nuclear deterrence 
theory, there is indeed stability between India and Pakistan, as no major war has taken 
place between the countries, and more importantly, nuclear war has been avoided. 
Nuclear deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural 
level.  
Acknowledging the limited scope of neorealism, as this perception solely can be used 
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for evaluating stability on the higher levels, the SISP and theories that include domestic 
factors have been applied in the two antitheses to gain additional insights. 
The SISP reveals inconsistencies in the Waltzian understanding of stability, as major 
conflicts have taken place between India and Pakistan, namely the Kargil Crisis in 1999 
and the Twin Peaks crisis in 2001-2. Can it, based upon this, be concluded that nuclear 
deterrence has not enhanced stability between India and Pakistan?  
First of all, from the analysis above one could deduce that nuclear deterrence has 
allowed the two adversaries, especially Pakistan, to initiate crises as they have been 
sheltered by their nuclear deterrence capabilities. Thus, from this point of view it could 
be concluded that nuclear deterrence has, in fact, not enhanced in the conflict on the 
lower levels.  
 
That said, even during crisis it is possible to identify a certain sense of cautiousness 
from both sides, which is likely to depict the relative effectiveness of nuclear deterrence 
to ensure the absence of large-scale war. Thus, the ability of deterrence to create some 
sense of stability should not be dismissed. Nuclear deterrence has thus enhanced 
stability to the extent of limiting the scale of, but not preventing, conventional war. As 
mentioned, the SISP does not offer an opposition to neorealism nor does it reject the 
main notions of nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, the SISP underlines the fact that 
nuclear deterrence should not be perceived naively as assuring complete stability, but as 
a means of limiting the extent to which wars can threaten stability. 
By applying the neoclassical realist framework for understanding stability, interesting 
factors have appeared. After having explored the “gap underneath” nuclear deterrence, 
the instability of the conflict has emerged as a certainty. From the analysis of the 
influence of domestic actors, such as the military and militant groups, it is evident that 
they are capable of influencing policy-decisions.  
However, the fact that the military – and through them the militant groups – is highly 
influential is not necessarily a problem in itself. It does, however, become problematic if 
this actor does not share the preferences and goals of the political leadership. This is 
important because the state will, in this case, not act unitarily. In this respect it is 
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interesting to note that throughout the conflict India has perceived Pakistan as a unitary 
actor. When Pakistani militants have carried out attacks on India, the Indian government 
has responded with aggression towards the state of Pakistan as a whole, and not directly 
towards the militant groups. Whether or not Pakistan has in fact acted unitarily is 
difficult to assess. The 2001 attacks on the Parliament could arguably be viewed as an 
aggression from a unitary Pakistan as the connection between the Musharraf 
government and the militants during this period has been established.  In 2008, on the 
other hand, it seems that Pakistan did not act unitarily and that the Mumbai bombings 
depict the differing preferences of the military and the Zardari government respectively. 
In this case, the lack of unity in Pakistan resulted in an abolition of the peace-talks and 
an enhancement of the hostile environment between the two adversaries. Furthermore, 
recalling the ability of militant groups, whether military-backed or not, to put an end to 
several rounds of peace dialogues between India and Pakistan and their role as a catalyst 
for India to initiate the Twin peaks crises, it is evident that domestic actors have been 
capable of influencing the stability of the conflict. Additionally, it is worth noticing that 
although the adversaries were ultimately deterred from taking the crisis to the next level, 
the Twin Peaks crisis was frighteningly close to escalation. Furthermore, the 
development of the “Cold Start” doctrine by India indicates a future in which the violent 
acts of militant groups may have disastrous ramifications as the doctrine allows a faster 
escalation of a crisis than has been the case so far. Thus, domestic actors have not only 
been capable of upsetting stability, they have in fact been influential enough to seriously 
challenge the deterring effect created by nuclear weapons.  
Thus, in similarity to the first antithesis it is possible to conclude that the scope of 
nuclear deterrence is limited to the higher levels of stability and, more importantly, that 
it does not prevent domestic actors from disrupting stability primarily on the lower 
levels.  
However, in regards to this, it is necessary to reflect upon the question of whether it has 
ever been the aim of nuclear deterrence to create stability on the lower levels. The 
neorealist understanding of stability as absence of war does not exclude the possibility 
of low-level conflict. Indeed, in the neorealist understanding, the prevention of large-
scale war is the closest we will ever get to stability and peace. Moreover, the neorealist 
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framework does simply not include domestic actors because it does not believe that 
domestic factors can cause substantial threats to the efficiency of nuclear deterrence. 
The “level-of-analysis” problem is hereby evident to its full extent.  
Taking all the indicators of instability into account, one might ask: has nuclear 
deterrence really enhanced stability? The answer to this question is less straightforward 
than it might appear. Firstly, the efficiency of nuclear weapons to prevent all-out war is 
difficult to assess and it is impossible to properly evaluate the effects of nuclear 
deterrence on stability. Indeed, the influence of nuclear deterrence cannot be separated 
from other possible influences upon the conflict between India and Pakistan and can 
thus not be explored isolated. Secondly, it is impossible to evaluate how the conflict 
would have evolved, had India and Pakistan not acquired nuclear weapons. Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, it is not possible to say when nuclear deterrence works, only when it 
does not. 
Moreover, it has been interesting to assess the years since 1998, when both states tested 
their nuclear weapons. At the time of the acquisition there was a widespread positive 
(and somewhat romanticised) sentiment towards the ability of these weapons to settle 
the protracted dispute in Kashmir: “[…] nuclear deterrence may, […], usher in an era 
of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the requisite incentives for 
resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and Kashmir” (Ahmad, 1999: 125).  
So far, the presence of nuclear weapons in the conflict has not had the expected effect. 
Quite on the contrary, the conflict, even in the nuclear-era, has been dominated by crises 
and cold air. Currently, all attempts to enhance stability and peace have been obstructed 
and the conflict remains highly unstable.  
Thus, based on the results from the above analyses, the final conclusion is that nuclear 
deterrence is likely to have been a strong factor in restraining the adversaries from 
escalating the crises in 1999 and 2001-02 respectively. That said, even if deterrence is 
effective in ensuring high-level stability it has been completely incapable of (a) solving 
the issues between the countries such as the dispute over Kashmir and (b) ensuring 
stability on the lower levels.  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8       Afterthoughts 
It is possible to take the reflections one step further. After having concluded that nuclear 
deterrence does not enhance stability on the lower levels, and knowing that this 
instability in turn could lead to instability at the higher levels, one might question the 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons as a mean of creating stability. In fact, with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons, the aim of wars should have changed from winning 
them to preventing them. At the time, the introduction of nuclear weapons was justified 
by realist assumptions; in a world determined by anarchy, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons was perceived as a stabilizer as any initiation of war could lead to a nuclear 
retaliation with disastrous consequences. 
 
As rationality is deeply embedded in the question of nuclear deterrence, the question of 
to what extent this rationality can be relied upon should be posed. Will the legal-rational 
Weberian state continue to have the monopoly on violence, and thus on nuclear 
weapons when power centres are increasingly dispersed? Can rationality be guaranteed?  
Various “What if” scenarios have been inherent to the question of nuclear weapons and 
have suffered from lack of verification. But, again, despite the fact that the argument 
have been endlessly repeated, the relation between India and Pakistan reminds us that 
such considerations remain of imminent importance and deserves further focus. 
 
9  Alternative Approaches and Perspectives 
Throughout this project we have explored how deterrence has had an impact on the 
relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, and how domestic actors have an 
imminent role in affecting the stability in the Indo-Pak relationship. We believe that the 
method and the approach we have chosen in order to answer our research question are 
valid and well founded. Nevertheless, we are aware that when analysing the India-
Pakistan conflict, there are other ways in which we could have approached the problem.  
Firstly, if we had the possibility to acquire first hand empirical data instead of having to 
rely solely on secondary sources, the focus could have been different. In fact, having the 
possibility to explore the domestic instabilities and their consequence for the stability of 
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the nuclear relation through interviews could have been particularly enriching for the 
analysis of domestic factors. Their accounts could for example have nuanced the 
military’s intentions and interpretations in regards to the Kargil war, or the preferences 
of the militant groups in Pakistan regarding India. This could have permitted us to 
efface the inherent bias of secondary sources and allowed us to understand the 
complexities at another level. 
Furthermore, the international pressures upon Pakistan and India and how this pressure 
influences the Indo-Pak relation could have been further explored. Except for the US, 
another actor that could have been worth taking into account is China. China is 
influential in the region, and it could have been prolific to explore the extent of China’s 
involvement in the conflict. The relation between India and China has historically been 
tense, and Pakistan, who traditionally has been supported by China, has been used as a 
strategic hedge against India.  
Indeed, the tensions between China and India stem from a history of deep- rooted 
prejudice, dispute over border issues and competition for resources (Malik, 2009; 1148). 
However, even though Beijing and New Delhi face disagreements, their economic ties 
are flourishing, and thus bridge their bilateral relationship. As Malik, professor in Asian 
Geopolitics and Proliferation, states, “Both have begun to behave like normal 
neighbours— allowing trade and investment and promoting people- to-people contact” 
(Malik, 2009; 1147). Thus, the relationship between India and China is improving due 
to increased trade, and this could result in China taking a more neutral stance on the 
Indian-Pakistan conflict (Curtis, 2009). In parallel, the situation between Beijing and 
Islamabad has changed (Chang in Salama, 2009). In fact, China is distancing itself from 
its old ally, which for instance is indicated by Zadari’s visit to China in 2008, where he 
appealed for financial aid. Even though China granted Islamabad $500 million, it was 
less than Zardari had expected25.  Furthermore, Beijing is increasingly preoccupied with 
the security in Pakistan, as Pakistani militants has targeted and attacked Chinese 
citizens26 (Curtis, 2009). Beijing is, moreover, troubled by the fact that Chinese Uighur 
                                                             
25 Zardari did not receive even close to the $14 billion needed to stabilize Pakistan (Salama, 2009). 
26 China has publically expressed its concerns over these attacks, which include “a kidnapping in 
Islamabad, the murder of three Chinese officials in Peshwar and a suicide bomber attack on a group of 
Chinese engineers in Baluchistan in 2007” (Curtis, 2009). 
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separatists are finding safe havens and receiving “[…] sanctuary and training on 
Pakistani territory” (Curtis, 2009). Thus, it can be argued that tensions are rising 
between China and Pakistan, and as Sayem Ali, an economist with Standard Chartered 
Bank in Karachi stated: "The cooperation [between Beijing and Islamabad] we saw 
during the Musharraf era just isn't there anymore” (Ali in Salma, 2009). 
In other words, China and Pakistan are still working together to hedge India, however, 
the relation has altered towards a less amiable relation. The Sino-Pakistani nexus, on the 
other hand, is reinforced as the two states are approaching each other in trade issues.  
The influence between China, Pakistan and India is thus interesting for an assessment of 
international pressures and structures that could influence the stability between the 
countries.  
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